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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OVER THIS CASE
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(j)(1996) and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court erroneously refuse to dismiss Appellee Landlord's eviction action
by concluding that the landlord's Notice to Quit and Summons were proper under Utah law?
Standard of Review: Correction of error. No deference to trial court. Ong International
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); Fowler v. Seiter. 838
P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
2. Did the trial court erroneously grant Appellee Landlord's motions for summary
judgment for possession and damages?
Standard of Review: "Correctness." No deference to trial court. All facts and
inferences viewed in light most favorable to party against whom summary judgment was
granted. Brown v. Weis. 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah 1994); Atlas Corporation v. The Clovis
National Bank. 737 P.2d 225,229 (Utah 1987); Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah. 780 P.2d
821, 824 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990).
3. Did the trial court err in its post-summary judgment rulings refusing to stay the
enforcement of such summary judgments, granting attorney fees and costs, and dismissing
Appellant Tenant's counterclaims and third-party complaint?

1

Standards of Review: (a) With respect to the trial court's refusal to stay enforcement
of its rulings on summary judgment, the standard is "abuse of discretion." See UTAH R.CIV.P.
62(a); Taylor National Inc. v. Jensen Brothers Construction Co., 641 P.2d 150, 154 (Utah
1982). (b) With respect to the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs, the standard is
"correctness." No deference is due the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 9325 936 (Utah
1994) (errors of law), (c) With respect to the trial court's award of attorneys fees and costs,
the standard is "clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988
(Utah 1988)(clear abuse of discretion), (d) With respect to the trial court's dismissal of the
Tenant's counterclaims and third-party complaint, the standard is "correctness." No deference
is due the trial court. State y. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (errors of law).
STATUTES AND RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE
OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL
§ 78-36-3.
Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life.
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful
detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property
or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or period for which
it is let to him, which specified temci or period, whether established by express
or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall be terminated without
notice at the expiration of the specified term or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly or
other periodic rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the
end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his designated
agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to
the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring him to quit
the premises at the expiration of that month or period; or

UTAH CODE ANN.
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(ii) in cases of tenancies at will where he remains in possession of the
premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days;
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after default
in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring in the
alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises,
has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after service, which
notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due;
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the covenants
of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or when he sets up
or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he suffers,
permits, or maintains on or about the premises any nuisance, including
nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after service
upon him of a three days' notice to quit; or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a neglect
or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, other than those previously mentioned, and after
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the performance of the conditions
or covenant or the surrender of the property, served upon him and upon any
subtenant in actual occupation of the premises remains uncomplied with for
three days after service. Within three days after the service of the notice, the
tenant, any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of
the term, or other person interested in its continuance may perform the
condition or covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that
if the covenants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot
afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given.
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined under
Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-36-3(l)(d) are not applicable
to nuisance actions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78- 38-16 only, (emphasis
added)
Allegations permitted in complaint
—Time for appearance
—Service of summons.
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting forth the facts on which he seeks
to recover, may set forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence which may
have accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer, and
claim damages therefor or compensation for the occupation of the premises, or both.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-8.

3

If the unlawful detainer charged is after default in the payment of rent, the complaint
shall state the amount of rent due. The court shall indorse on the summons the number
of days within which the defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which
shall not be less than three or more than 20 days from the date of service. The court
may authorize service by publication or mail for cause shown. Service by publication
is complete one week after publication. Service by mail is complete three days after
mailing. The summons shall be changed in form to conform to the time of service as
ordered, and shall be served as in other cases, (emphasis added)
Judgment for restitution, damages, and reint
—Immediate enforcement
-Treble damages.
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judgment entered
in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of the premises as
provided in Section 78-36-10.5. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement
under which the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment
shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any
of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in
the complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in
the payment of rent; and
(e) die abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38-9
through 78-38-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times
the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2Xa) through (2Xc), and for
reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of the rent,
execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the
judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately,
(emphasis added)

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-10.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is about whether Landlord Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, through bad
faith conduct, could lawfully prevent Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. from exercising its Option to
Extend its lease so that Parkside could evict Insure-Rite and re-let to another tenant to whom
Parkside had already promised the lease premises. Appellant-Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. seeks
relief from the trial court's final judgment and antecedent rulings and orders illegally
asserting jurisdiction over this case; evicting Appellant from its premises; imposing liability
upon Appellant for damages, attorneys fees and costs; and dismissing Appellant's
counterclaims and third party complaint.
On February 24, 1997, Appellee Parkside Salt Lake Corporation as Landlord, and
Appellant Insure-Rite, Inc. as Tenant, signed a lease for commercial office space in
Parkside's 13-story office building located at 215 South State Street in downtown Salt Lake
City. (R. 10)(relevant lease provisions attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 1) The leased
premises were a comparatively modest 5,037 square feet, rented at an annual rate of $16.15
per square foot. (R. 10) The Lease began on May 1, 1997, and was to expire on June 30,
1998, unless the Tenant exercised its Option to Extend the lease for an additional 3-year term
upon the same terms and conditions except for the monthly rent. (R. 53) The Tenant's
"Option to Extend'1 the lease provided:
"Provided Tenant has not defaulted under this Lease, and that this Lease is in
full force and effect at the time Tenant exercises the option to extend as
5

provided herein, then Tenant shall have the option (the "Option to Extend") to
extend the term of this Lease for an additional period of three (3) years (the
"Extension Term"), upon the same terms and conditions except Basic Rent
shall be adjusted to the then prevailing market rates, commencing on the day
after the Expiration Date of the Lease. The Option to Extend must be
exercised by written notice delivered by Tenant to Landlord at any time prior
to March 1, 1998. Thirty days after Tenant notifies Landlord it is exercising
its option, Landlord must provide Tenant with written notice of the new rental.
"Market rate", as used by Landlord to determine the new Basic Rent shall be
the rental rate for comparable space of comparable size for a similar term for
a similar credit-worthy tenant by reference first to the Building and second to
the other similar buildings in downtown Salt Lake City. Tenant may reject the
new rental rate for a period of 30 days following notice from the Landlord, at
which time Tenant's exercise of its Option to Extend shall be null and void. If
Tenant does not notify Landlord within 30 days of Landlord's notice to Tenant
of the new rental rate, then Tenant shall automatically be deemed to have
accepted the market rental rate in the notice." (R. 53)(emphasis added)
On February 6, 1998, almost a month before the deadline for doing so, the Tenant
provided the Landlord written notice exercising the Option to Extend the lease for three
years. (R. 204XAddendum Exhibit 2) On February 10, 1998, instead of communicating a
proposed "new Basic Rent" computed according to the terms of the Option to Extend,
Landlord Parkside responded with a proposal for a whole new lease, which violated the
requirements imposed on the landlord by the Option to Extend because, inter alia, the
landlord's response: (1) proposed an entirely new lease, rather than setting out the "new
Basic Rent" for a three-year term extension as expressly required by the Option to Extend;
(2) contained annual escalations in rent for each year of the three-year extension term, in
violation of the express terms of the Option to Extend, which provided for the "new Basic

6

Rent" to be locked in at the "then prevailing market rates" as of the date of the extension; (3)
omitted consideration of the lower comparable rentals in the Landlord's own Parkside Tower
building in determining the new Basic Rent, as expressly required by the Option to Extend;
(4) contrary to the express requirement in the Option to Extend that the 3-year extension
should be "upon the same terms and conditions" as the original lease except for the new
Basic Rent, the Landlord demanded that the Tenant pay for all of its own parking spaces,
whereas under the original Lease, the Tenant received 5 free parking spaces, which had a
value of approximately $10,000 over the 3-year extension; and (5) refused to offer
comparable relocation premises in the event of nonrenewal, as required by the original lease.
(R. 206-209)(Addendum Exhibit 3)
In its February 10, 1998 response, the Landlord also stated:
"... Landlord reserves the right to issue lease proposals with respect to the
same premises to any number of parties at any one time and from time to
time... by Landlord at its sole discretion." (R. 207)(emphasis added)
In fact, Access Long Distance, a major tenant which rented the 10th floor of Landlord's
building, had already demanded the rental space occupied by Appellant Tenant, and the
Landlord preferred to have Access Long Distance occupy the space. (R. 732 ffl[13,
14)(Kasteler Affidavit attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 4) The Landlord's February 10,
1998 proposal for a whole new lease, therefore, was carefully crafted as "an offer you can't
accept," so that Appellant Tenant would reject it and move out. (R. 732, ^ 14).

7

Not to be so easily kicked out, on March 5, 1998, the Tenant re-confirmed its exercise
of the Option to Extend for three years upon the same terms and conditions as the original
lease, at a new Basic Rent of $17.00 per square foot, a 5% increase over the original lease
rent of $16.15 per square foot. (R. 55yAddendum Exhibit 5) In contrast, Landlord in its
proposal for a new lease had demanded an average of $18.00 per square foot, an 11%
increase over the original lease rent. (R. 749)
Landlord Parkside did not otherwise respond within thirty days from February 6,
1998, the date when Tenant exercised the option, as the Landlord was required to do under
the Option to Extend. (R. 53) Instead, on March 16, 1998, thirty-eight days after Tenant had
exercised the Option to Extend, Landlord Parkside responded with a second letter which also
violated the requirements imposed on the Landlord by the Option to Extend, because the
Landlord: (1) gave Tenant only four days, until March 20, 1998, to respond, not 30 days as
required by the Option to Extend; (2) allocated "weights" to the allegedly comparable rentals,
in order to arrive at a higher proposed new Basic Rent, contrary to the Option to Extend,
which contained no provision for "weighting" the comparables; (3) continued to insist on
annual escalations in rent for each year of the 3-year extension term, in violation of the
express terms of the Option to Extend, which provided for the "new Basic Rent" to be locked
in at the "then prevailing market rates" as of the date of the extension; (4) demanded an
average yearly new Basic Rent of $18.00 per square foot, whereas the rental rate in the

8

Landlord's own building, which was the primary "comparable" in the Option to Extend,
according to Landlord's letter itself was $17.00 per square foot; and (5) still refused to offer
comparable relocation premises in the event of nonrenewal, as required in the original lease.
(R. 57-60YAddendum Exhibit 6)
The Landlord's March 16, 1998 letter further implemented the Landlord's plan to
provide the Tenant with "an offer you can't accept," because by that time, the Landlord had
already leased the premises to Access Long Distance. (R. 733, ][18yAddendum Exhibit 4)
Access Long Distance, under its new name of McLeod USA, presently occupies the premises
formerly rented by Appellant Tenant.
By letter dated March 25, 1998, Tenant strenuously objected to the Landlord's
apparent attempt to constructively evict the Tenant by making it impossible for the Tenant
to accept the Landlord's response to the Tenant's exercise of the Option to Extend. (R. 6264YAddendum Exhibit 7) The Tenant reiterated the inadequacies of the Landlord's February
10 and March 16 responses. (R. 63-64) In order to assure that Tenant did not reject a
reasonable "new Basic Rent," however, the Tenant stated that since according to the
Landlord, the Landlord's other tenants in the building paid $17.00 per square foot, compared
to the Tenant's original lease rate of $16.15 per square foot, therefore,
"effective July 1, 1998, and continuously monthly thereafter, Tenant shall pay
as and for basic rents the sum of $17.00 per square foot for the following 36
months, and all other terms, provisions, and conditions of the Lease shall be
and remain in full force and effect."
9

(R. 64)(emphasis added) The Tenant thus did not reject a properly formulated ,fnew Basic
Rent," but given the Landlord's bad faith responses to the Tenant's exercise of the Option to
Extend, Tenant instead sought to arrive at a reasonable "new Basic Rent" for the extension
term. (R. 733, ^fl9)(Addendum Exhibit 4)
The Tenant paid rent on a timely basis for the months of March, April, May and June
of 1998 remaining on the original lease, and also tendered payments at the rate of $17.00 per
square foot for subsequent months, although such subsequent payments were returned by the
Landlord. (R. 733, ]f20)(Addendum Exhibit 4) Instead, by letter dated April 27, 1998, the
Landlord through its attorney asserted that "Under the terms of the lease, [the Tenant] must
accept the market rental rate established by the landlord or rescind its election to extend the
lease term." (R. 66-67)(Addendum Exhibit 8) The Landlord took the position that "If InsureRite did not agree with the market rate proposed by Parkside its remedy was to find new
leased space." (R. 758) That, apparently, was what the Landlord intended all along.
On July 9, 1998, a little over a week after the end of the original lease term, and in
furtherance of its campaign to kick out the Tenant, Landlord Parkside served Tenant InsureRite, Inc. with a "NOTICE TO QUIT" which did not comply with any of the different types
of Notices provided by law. (R. 69YAddendum Exhibit 9) The Landlord candidly admitted
this, explaining that it "was not required to provide Insure-Rite with any notice" and that
such notice had been provided merely "as a courtesy," because the original lease term had
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ended. (R. 756) The Landlord thus sought to capitalize on its bad faith in undermining the
Tenant's attempt to exercise the Option to Extend by pummeling the Tenant with
unreasonable demands until the original lease term ended, then attempting to treat the Tenant
as a mere trespasser whose lease had ended, and for which no Notice to Quit is required
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(a). (R. 756)
The Tenant retained a tenant's status, however, and was entitled to a proper Notice
to Quit, on three independent, alternative grounds. First, under the express terms of the
original lease, and totally independently of the Option to Extend, the Tenant's holding over
after the expiration of the original lease term converted the relationship into a month-tomonth, periodic tenancy:
"SECTION 22. HOLDING OVER
Should Tenant, with or without Landlord's written consent, hold over after the
expiration of this Lease, Tenant shall pay, in advance, monthly rent at the rate
of two hundred percent (200%) of one month's Basic Annual Rent, plus all
Additional Rent provided by this Lease." (R. 34)(emphasis added)
The Landlord admitted that Insure-Rite, Inc. was still its tenant by billing Insure-Rite,
Inc. under Section 22 of the lease for twice the $16.15-per-square-foot original monthly rent
as "holdover rent". (R. 1477, p.9, lines 5-17)(hearing transcript excerpts attached hereto as
Addendum Exhibit 10) The Tenant, contending that the lease had been extended for a 3-year
term under the Option, instead tendered monthly rent at the rate of $17.00 per-square-foot,
but the Landlord refused such rent. (R. 733, H20)(Addendum Exhibit 4) Since the Tenant
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became a month-to-month tenant under the lease, and since the underpayment constituted
a "default in the payment of rent," the Landlord not only was required to provide the Tenant
a 3-day Notice to Quit, but such Notice also had to require "in the alternative the payment
of the [additional] rent or the surrender of the detained premises" under UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-36-3(l)(c). The landlord's Notice to Quit did not comply. (R. 69)
Insure-Rite, Inc. retained a tenant's status under a second independent ground. The
express terms of the Option to Extend made provision for the circumstances that indeed
arose. The Option to Extend expressly provided that if the Tenant did not "notify" the
Landlord in response to the Landlord's (albeit defectively formulated) proposed new Basic
Rent, the lease extension occurred automatically for a 3-year term at the new rental rate
propounded by the Landlord:
"If Tenant does not notify Landlord within 30 days of Landlord's notice to
Tenant of the new rental rate, then Tenant shall automatically be deemed to
have accepted the market rental rate in the notice." (R. 53)(emphasis added)
Indeed, the Tenant never did accept nor reject the Landlord's propounded rate, but instead
strenuously objected that the Landlord's responses were wholly out of compliance with the
Landlord's obligations under the Option to Extend. (R. 55; 62-64YAddendum Exhibits 5 &
7) Under these circumstances, the Option to Extend therefore provided that the Landlord was
entitled to the approximately $18.00 -per-square-foot rent proposed by the Landlord rather
than the $17.00 per-square-foot which Tenant in fact tendered. Since the Tenant thereby
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became a tenant for a term of 3 years, but because the underpayment constituted a "default
in the payment of rent/1 under this alternative ground as well, the Landlord not only was
required to provide the Tenant a 3-day Notice to Quit, but such Notice also had to require
"in the alternative [for] the payment of the [additional] rent or the surrender of the detained
premises" under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(c). The landlord's Notice to Quit did not do
so. (R. 69)
The Tenant retained a tenant's status under a third independent ground, whereby the
Landlord cannot be rewarded for unconscionable behavior aimed at preventing the Tenant
from extending the lease pursuant to the Option to Extend. Under these circumstances, the
nature of the relationship between Parkside and Insure-Rite, Inc. after the expiration of the
original lease term, for purposes of a Notice to Quit, is determined from the particular facts
giving rise to the controversy in order to arrive "at what is fair and reasonable in adjustment
of the rights of the parties." Thomas J. Peck & Sons. Inc.. 30 Utah 2d 187, 193, 515 P.2d
446, 449 (1973). At minimum, the lease was extended by operation of law on a month-tomonth basis, and the Tenant's provision of the $17.00 per-square-foot rent was reasonable
under the circumstances. The Landlord thus was required to provide Tenant with a 15-day
Notice to Quit under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(b)(i) in order to terminate such resulting
periodic tenancy. Alternatively, Insure-Rite, Inc. became a "tenant at will," and the Landlord
was required to provide a 5-day Notice to Quit under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(b)(ii).
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The landlord's 3-day Notice to Quit did not comply with either section. (R. 69)
Instead, on July 15, 1998, a mere six days after serving its ,fnon-Notice to Quit,"
Landlord Parkside pressed its offensive to kick out the Tenant by filing a Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer. (R. 1-5) Closely on the heels of such filing, on July 20, 1998, upon Ex
Parte Motion, Landlord Parkside obtained from the trial court an "Order Shortening Time
to Answer Complaint" from twenty (20) to seven (7) days. (R. 76-77) The Landlord served
the Tenant the following day, on July 21, 1998, but voluntarily withdrew such service when
confronted with the Tenant's challenge to the defective Summons. (R. 92-97) On July 27,
1998, the Landlord tried again, serving the Tenant with a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
(R. 1-73), the Order Shortening Time to Answer Complaint (R. 76-77), and a second
Summons. (R. 89-9 lYAddendum Exhibit 11)
Significantly, the trial court did not "indorse on the summons the number of days
within which the defendant [was] required to appear and defend the action" as required by
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8. (R. 105-106) On August 3, 1998, responding to the Landlord's
onslaught, Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. appeared specially and filed a Motion to Quash the
Summons Served on July 27, 1998 on that ground. (R. 98-99) Pressing its attack, however,
on August 19, 1998 Landlord Parkside filed its first motion for partial summary judgment,
seeking eviction of the Tenant. (R. 137-139)
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At a HEARING on October 26, 1998, the trial court: (1) summarily denied Tenant
Insure-Rite's Motion to Quash the Summons Served on July 27, 1998 and (2) postponed
consideration of the Landlord's motion for summary judgment in order to give the Tenant
time to file opposing memoranda. (R. 1045, p. 16, lines 16-19)(hearing transcript excerpts
attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 12)
Over a three-day period, the Tenant quickly marshaled its forces against the
Landlord's vicious attack. On November 9, 1998, the Tenant appeared specially once more
and filed a Motion to Dismiss the Landlord's complaint on three alternative grounds: (1)
Insufficiency of Process, for lack of a properly indorsed Summons; (2) Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction, for lack of a properly indorsed Summons; and (3) Failure to State a Claim for
Which Relief Can be Granted, for failure to serve a proper Notice to Quit. (R. 554-557) The
following day, November 10, 1998, Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. further appeared specially and
filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. (R. 612-707) The day after that,
on November 11, 1998, Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. appeared specially once more and filed its
Opposition to the landlord's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the issue
of possession. (R. 708-752) In that Opposition, the Tenant also renewed its objection to the
deficient Notice to Quit as the threshold basis for urging denial of the Landlord's motion for
summary judgment. (R. 719-721)
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At a HEARING on November 13, 1998, however, the trial court through oral rulings
summarily precluded further consideration of the Tenant's Motion to Dismiss the Landlord's
complaint, including the Tenant's contention that the Landlord's Notice to Quit was
inadequate under Utah law: (a) by granting the landlord's motion for partial summary
judgment and evicting the Tenant; and (b) by stating, "Your client received the proper
summons. That is my ruling on that. That was my ruling before." (R. 1041, p. 17, lines 24)(hearing transcript excerpts attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 13) On the same day,
the trial court also signed a written ORDER denying the Tenant's earlier Motion to Quash
the Landlord's July 27, 1998 Summons. (R. 761-763) On November 30, 1998, the trial court
signed a written ORDER granting the landlord's motion for partial summary judgment and
evicting the Tenant. (R. 796-798) The Tenant vacated the premises on December 6, 1998.
(R.8l2,p.3,1}5)
In addition to the trial court's errors in refusing to dismiss the Landlord's action for
failure to provide a proper Notice to Quit and a properly indorsed Summons, the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for possession to the landlord erred by deciding, genuinely
disputed issues of fact. As the trial court candidly admitted at the November 13, 1998
hearing, it recognized that there were disputed genuine issues of fact:
"I mean, there are very few issues of fact here, obviously."
(R. 1037, p.2, lines 22-23)(Addendum Exhibit 13Xemphasis added)
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The trial court recognized that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding the procedure
which the Landlord was to follow, when the trial court asked counsel for the Landlord:
"Well, tell me before you step down, in that case, what does the language
[f]comparable size, similar terms, similar credit worthy tenant, first by
reference to the building, second to the other similar buildings in Downtown
Salt Lake,[f] what does that suppose to mean if you can't use it to see whether
or not the market rate is fair?" [sic]
(R. 1037, p.3, lines 16-22YAddendum Exhibit 13Xemphasis added)
The trial court also recognized that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding the scope of
the landlord's discretion in setting the new Basic Rent, the avenues open to the tenant once
the Landlord responded, and whether the Landlord's responses were in good faith. Instead,
the trial court decided these disputed genuine issues of material fact:
"THE COURT:... I'm granting the motion for partial summary judgment. The
reason is this phrase, sentence, which I think is the key to the whole case and
the renewal of an option, which is 'Market rate as used by landlord to
determine the new basic rent shall be the rental rate.' The reason this is not a
formula which can result in an exact calculation no matter what an appraiser
says or anybody else - had it specifically identified buildings, specific
buildings, specific floors, specific configurations or minimum and maximum
square footage, maybe we could get there. But my ruling is what this does is
about what [Landlord's counsel] said it does, that is it requires fairness.
Somebody couldn't - the landlord couldn't have said 30 bucks, the same way
the tenant couldn't have come back with two bucks. It says there's got to be a
fair market price. We are talking about a range. There is no question in my
mind but that $18 falls within the fair range that we are talking about. ..."
(R. 1040-1041, p. 15, lines 10-25; p. 16, lines 1-12XAddendum Exhibit 13yemphasis added)
The trial court on summary judgment thus improperly decided these disputed issues
of fact which, as the court itself acknowledged, were "the key" to the whole case. Most
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profoundly, the parties disagreed about what the "new Basic Rent" should be: the Landlord
in its February 10, 1998 and March 16, 1998 letters demanded, inter alia, $18.00 per square
foot, an 11% increase over the original lease rate, whereas the Tenant's expert contended it
should be $17.00, a 5% increase. (R. 749) The trial court improperly decided that
fundamental disputed genuine issue of material fact as well: "There is no question in my
mind but that $18 falls within the fair range that we are talking about." (R. 1041, p. 16, lines
3 -4XAddendum Exhibit 13)(emphasis added)
The Tenant unsuccessfully sought both Interlocutory Review and Appeal as of Right
from the trial court's rulings. On January 20, 1999, however, the Utah Supreme Court
dismissed without prejudice Tenant's appeal as of right from the November 30, 1998 trial
court ORDER, (R. 985) and on January 27, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court similarly denied
Tenant's Petition for Permission to Appeal the November 30, 1998 trial court ORDER by
way of Interlocutory Review. (R. 987)
On March 26, 1999, the trial court entered a written ORDER granting Landlord
Parkside's motion for partial summary judgment regarding damages, and trebled the amount
to $108,417.24. (R. 1184-1185) Almost immediately, and without allowing the Tenant an
opportunity to pay such amount, the Landlord on March 30, 1999, recorded ]is pendens
against the homes of both of the sureties on the tenant's possession bond. (R. 1237-1244)
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On April 27, 1999, the trial court entered a written ORDER denying the Tenant's
Motion to Stay Enforcement of the Judgment. (R. 1282-1283) On June 4, 1999, the landlord
acknowledged the Tenant's payment of the $108,417.24 judgment. (R. 1289-1291) But on
June 30, 1999, the landlord nevertheless obtained a Writ of Garnishment in the amount of
$14,500.00 against the Tenant's checking account. (R. 1301-1304)
On July 27, 1999, the trial court entered a written ORDER awarding $33,823.50 in
attorneys fees and costs to Landlord Parkside. (R. 1323-1324) On July 30, 1999, the
Landlord acknowledged the Tenant's payment of interest on the $108,417.24 judgment. (R.
1327-1329) And on August 30, 1999, the landlord further acknowledged the tenant's payment
of $33,823.50 in attorneys fees and costs to the landlord. (R. 1362-1364)
On November 2, 1999, the trial court entered a written ORDER granting a motion by
Landlord Parkside, and Third Party Defendants Collins and Wallace & Associates, entitled
"Motion to Dismiss/or Alternatively for Judgment on the Pleadings, and Wallace &
Associates' and Collin Perkins' Motion to Dismiss." (R. 1368-1369) The trial court
considered its earlier rulings on summary judgment to have disposed entirely of the Tenant's
counterclaims and third party complaint. (R. 1480, Trial Court Hearing Transcript, October
1, 1999 hearing, p.2, lines 17-18: "THE COURT: Oh, I remember. I've already granted
summary judgment on your claims.")
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In its second attempt to obtain appellate review of the trial court's rulings, on
November 4, 1999, the Tenant filed its second Notice of Appeal. (R. 1370-1372) On
January 11, 2000, however, the Utah Supreme Court in Promax Development Corp. v. Raile.
998 P.2d 254 (Utah 2000) overruled prior Utah Court of Appeal authority and held that cases
in which additional attorneys' fees claims are pending are not "final" for purposes of appeal.
On March 14, 2000, upon Tenant's request in light of the Promax decision, the Court of
Appeals, to which the case had been poured over, dismissed the Tenant's appeal without
prejudice. (R. 1437-1437A)
On June 21, 2000, Landlord Parksidefiledits "Fifth Partial Satisfaction of Judgment"
acknowledging that the Tenant had paid all attorney fees and costs as ordered by the trial
court. (R. 1459-1461) On June 28, 2000, the trial court entered its "Order for Entry of Final
Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation" in accordance with the Stipulation of the parties. (R.
1462-1464) Finally, on its present, third, attempt to obtain appellate review, the Tenant filed
its Notice of Appeal for this matter on June 29, 2000. (R. 1465-1467)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case is about whether Landlord Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, through bad
faith conduct, could lawfully prevent Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. from exercising its Option to
Extend its lease so that Parkside could evict Insure-Rite and re-let to another tenant to whom
Parkside had already promised the lease premises.
The legal issues fall into three major categories: First, as a threshold matter, the trial
court should have dismissed the Landlord's action because both the Notice to Quit as well
as the Summons used by the Landlord were statutorily insufficient. The Notice to Quit was
mandatory because the Tenant was not reduced to a mere trespasser by the Landlord's tactics
aimed at obstructing the Tenant's exercise of the Option to Extend the lease. And, the Notice
to Quit used by the Landlord did not comply with the requirements for any of the types of
Notices to Quit allowed by Utah's Unlawful Detainer statute. The Summons used by the
Landlord was inadequate because it was neither indorsed nor changed in form by the Court,
as required by statute. Since the Notice to Quit was inadequate, the trial court should have
dismissed the Landlord's action for failure to state a claim. Since the Summons also was
inadequate, the trial court should have quashed the summons and dismissed the Landlord's
action for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Tenant. The Tenant through special
appearances throughout this litigation repeatedly has raised these threshold defects, but to
no avail.
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The second major category of legal issues arose because the trial court nevertheless
assumed jurisdiction over the case and granted the Landlord's motion for summary judgment
for possession, as well as a second motion for summary judgment for damages. Each
summary judgment was improper because it included the threshold defects in the Notice to
Quit and the Summons. Moreover, in each summary judgment ruling, the trial court erred by
adjudicating genuine issues of material fact. In addition, in the summary judgment for
damages, the trial court erred by trebling the damages involved, since the Tenant was never
in unlawful detainer, as required by statute for trebling of damages.
The third major category of legal issues arose in three areas of post-summary
judgment rulings by the trial court. First, the court abused its discretion because it refused
to stay enforcement of its rulings on summary judgment. Second, in light of the errors in the
underlying summary judgments upon which such fees and costs were based, the court further
erred in granting attorneys fees and costs to the Landlord, and the trial court compounded
such error by failing to make findings regarding the reasonableness of such fees and costs.
Third, the trial court also erred in dismissing the Tenant's counterclaims and third-party
complaint on the basis of its earlier summary judgment rulings.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
BOTH THE NOTICE TO QUIT AND THE SUMMONS SERVED ON
THE TENANT BY THE LANDLORD WERE STATUTORILY
INSUFFICIENT, DEPRIVING THE TRIAL COURT OF
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE LANDLORD'S EVICTION ACTION1
A.

The Landlord did not provide an appropriate Notice to Quit, hence the Tenant
was not in "unlawful detainer1f under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(1), so the trial
court erred by not dismissing the Landlord's action
An "unlawful detainer" action is a statutory proceeding whereby a landlord can

summarily regain possession from a tenant who is "guilty of an unlawful detainer". UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-36-3. It is a severe remedy, in derogation of the common law, so the
requirements for an Unlawful Detainer Action must be strictly complied with before such
an action may be brought. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852, 853 (Utah 1979).
How a tenant becomes "guilty of an unlawful detainer" depends on the type of
tenancy involved, which in turn is defined by the lease between the parties and the
circumstances surrounding their relationship. In the ordinary case, a tenancy for a specified

l

. The Tenant raised the insufficiency of the Notice to Quit and the Summons by
special appearance at every opportunity. In particular, the trial court denied the Tenant's
Motion to Quash the Summons Served on July 27, 1998, Motion to Dismiss the
Landlord's Complaint, and Oppositions to the Landlord's Motions for Summary
Judgment, in which the Tenant raised these objections. The standard of review for these
threshold issues on appeal is the "correction of error" standard, for which no deference is
due the trial court. Ong International (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447,
455 (Utah 1993); Fowler v. Seiter. 838 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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term ends of its own accord and the tenant is "guilty of an unlawful detainer" without notice
at the expiration of the term.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-3(l)(a). In all other tenancies,

however, a proper Notice to Quit must be served on a tenant in order to "place the tenant in
unlawful detainer." Sovereen v. Meadows. 595 P.2d 852, 854 (Utah 1979).
1.

The Landlord was required to provide a Notice to Quit

Landlord Parkside contends that it was not required to provide any Notice to Quit at
all because its Unlawful Detainer Action was begun after the end of the original term of the
lease. (R. 756) Under three independent grounds, however, the Tenant retained a tenant's
status and was entitled to a proper Notice to Quit. Since the Landlord failed to provide a
proper Notice, the Tenant was never in unlawful detainer.
First, under the express terms of the original lease, independently of the Option to
Extend, the Tenanfs holding over after the expiration of the original lease term converted the
relationship into a month-to-month, periodic tenancy:
"SECTION 22. HOLDING OVER
Should Tenant, with or without Landlord's written consent, hold over after the
expiration of this Lease, Tenant shall pay, in advance, monthly rent at the rate
of two hundred percent (200%) of one month's Basic Annual Rent, plus all
Additional Rent provided by this Lease."
(R. 34, p.25, § 22)(Addendum Exhibit lXemphasis added)
The Landlord admitted that Insure-Rite, Inc. was still its tenant by billing Insure-Rite,
Inc. for "holdover rent" determined under this section in the lease. (R. 1477, p.9, lines 517)(hearing transcript excerpts attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 10) Thus, the Landlord
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demanded twice the $16.15-per-square-foot original monthly rent. Contending that the lease
had been extended for a 3-year term under the Option, the Tenant instead tendered monthly
rent at the rate of $17.00 per-square-foot, but the Landlord returned such payments. (R. 733,
^f20)(Addendum Exhibit 4) Since the Tenant thereby became a month-to-month tenant, and
since the underpayment constituted a "default in the payment of rent," the Landlord not only
was required to provide the Tenant a 3-day Notice to Quit, but such Notice also had to
require "in the alternative the payment of the [additional] rent or the surrender of the
detained premises."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-3(l)(c)(3-day Notice to Quit required,

providing in the alternative for the payment of rent or surrender of the premises); Cache
County v. Beus. 978 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(3-day Notice to Quit without
"remedy or quit" provision is statutorily defective); see also Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d
852, 853-54 (Utah 1979)(unconditional notice to quit served on month-to-month tenant is
insufficient to place tenant in unlawful detainer). Landlord Parkside's Notice to Quit
similarly did not comply. (R. 69)2
Insure-Rite, Inc. retained a tenant's status under a second independent ground. The
express terms of the Option to Extend provided for the circumstances that indeed arose. The
Option to Extend expressly set out that if the Tenant did not "notify" the Landlord in
2

. Notably, if the Tenant thereafter had brought the rent current, the Landlord still
could have terminated such month-to-month tenancy with a 15-day Notice to Quit under
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3(l)(b)(i). The Landlord herein, however, served only a 3-day
Notice to Quit.
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response to the Landlord's (albeit defectively formulated) proposed new Basic Rent, the lease
extension occurred automatically for a 3-year term at the new rental rate propounded by the
Landlord:
"If Tenant does not notify Landlord within 30 days of Landlord's notice to
Tenant of the new rental rate, then Tenant shall automatically be deemed to
have accepted the market rental rate in the notice." (R. 53)(emphasis added)
Indeed, the Tenant neither accepted nor rejected the Landlord's propounded rate, but instead
strenuously objected that the Landlord's responses were wholly out of compliance with the
Landlord's obligations under the Option to Extend. (R. 55; 62-64YAddendum Exhibits 5 &
7) The Option to Extend provided that under those circumstances, the Landlord was entitled
to the approximately $18.00 -per-square-foot rent proposed by the Landlord, rather than the
$17.00 per-square-foot which the Tenant tendered. The Tenant thereby became a tenant for
a term of 3 years. Since the underpayment constituted a "default in the payment of rent,"
however, the Landlord was required to provide the Tenant a 3-day Notice to Quit that also
included "in the alternative [for] the payment of the [additional] rent or the surrender of the
^ detained premises." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(c); Cache County v. Beus, 978 P.2d
1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(3-day Notice to Quit for nonpayment of rent must provide
for alternative of payment of rent); see also Jacobsen v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 68, 278 P.2d
294, 301 (1954)(unconditional notice to quit served on term tenant is insufficient to place
the tenant in unlawful detainer). The Landlord's Notice to Quit failed to do so. (R. 69)
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Under a third independent ground, the Tenant retained a tenant's status, was entitled
to and was not provided a proper Notice to Quit, and therefore was not in unlawful detainer.
The equitable concept of unconscionability applies in the landlord-tenant setting. Wade v.
Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1016-17 (Utah 1991). In performing its obligations under the Option
to Extend, the Landlord had an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Resource
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah
1985). In Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., 706 P.2d at 104142, the Court explained that "procedural unconscionability" focuses on the manner of
behavior, and "substantive unconscionability" focuses on the content of the terms involved.
Landlord Parkside engaged in both "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability, in
violation of its obligations of good faith and fair dealing. The starting point is the "Option
to Extend" the lease, which provided:
"Provided Tenant has not defaulted under this Lease, and that this Lease is in
full force and effect at the time Tenant exercises the option to extend as
provided herein, then Tenant shall have the option (the "Option to Extend") to
extend the term of this Lease for an additional period of three (3) years (the
"Extension Term"), upon the same terms and conditions except Basic Rent
shall be adjusted to the then prevailing market rates, commencing on the day
after the Expiration Date of the Lease. The Option to Extend must be
exercised by written notice delivered by Tenant to Landlord at any time prior
to March 1, 1998. Thirty days after Tenant notifies Landlord it is exercising
its option, Landlord must provide Tenant with written notice of the new rental.
"Market rate", as used by Landlord to determine the new Basic Rent shall be
the rental rate for comparable space of comparable size for a similar term for
a similar credit-worthy tenant by reference first to the Building and second to
the other similar buildings in downtown Salt Lake City. Tenant may reject the
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new rental rate for a period of 30 days following notice from the Landlord, at
which time Tenant's exercise of its Option to Extend shall be null and void. If
Tenant does not notify Landlord within 30 days of Landlord's notice to Tenant
of the new rental rate, then Tenant shall automatically be deemed to have
accepted the market rental rate in the notice." (R. 53)(emphasis added)
On February 6, 1998, the Tenant properly provided the Landlord with written notice
exercising the Option to Extend the lease. (R. 204) On February 10, 1998, however, instead
of communicating a proposed "new Basic Rent" computed according to the terms of the
Option to Extend, Landlord Parkside responded with a proposal for a whole new lease,
which violated the terms of the Option to Extend and the Landlord's obligation to act in good
faith, because the Landlord's response: (1) proposed an entirely new lease, rather than setting
out the "new Basic Rent" for a three-year term extension; (2) contained annual escalations
in rent for each year of the 3-year extension term, contrary to the Option to Extend, which
provided that the "new Basic Rent" would be locked in at the "then prevailing market rates"
as of the date of the extension; (3) omitted consideration of the lower comparable rentals in
the Landlord's own Parkside Tower building in determining the new Basic Rent, as expressly
required by the Option to Extend; (4) contrary to the express requirement in the Option to
Extend that the extension should be "upon the same terms and conditions" as the original
lease except for the new Basic Rent, the Landlord demanded that the Tenant pay for all of
its own parking spaces, whereas under the original Lease, the Tenant received 5 free parking
spaces, which had a value of approximately $10,000 over the 3-year extension; and (5)
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refused to offer comparable relocation premises in the event of nonrenewal, as required by
the original lease. (R.206-209)
In its February 10, 1998 response Landlord Parkside also stated:
"... Landlord reserves the right to issue lease proposals with respect to the
same premises to any number of parties at any one time and from time to
time... by Landlord at its sole discretion." (R. 207)(emphasis added)
In fact, Access Long Distance, a major tenant which rented the 10th floor of Landlord's
building, had already demanded the rental space occupied by Appellant Tenant, and the
Landlord preferred to have Access Long Distance occupy the space. (R. 732 ffi[13,
14)(Kasteler Affidavit attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 4) The Landlord's February 10,
1998 proposal for a whole new lease, therefore, was carefully crafted as "an offer you can't
accept," so that Appellant Tenant would reject it and move out. (R. 732, ^f 14).
On March 5, 1998, the Tenant re-confirmed its exercise of the Option to Extend for
three years upon the same terms and conditions as the original lease, at a new Basic Rent of
$17.00 per square foot, a 5% increase over the original lease rent of $16.15 per square foot.
(R. 55XAddendum Exhibit 5) In contrast, Landlord in its new lease proposal had demanded
an average of $18.00 per square foot, an 11% increase over the original lease rent. (R. 749)
Landlord Parkside did not otherwise respond within thirty days from February 6,
1998, the date when Tenant exercised the option, as the landlord was required to do under
the Option to Extend. (R. 53) Instead, on March 16, 1998, thirty-eight days after Tenant had
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exercised the Option to Extend, Landlord Parkside responded with a second letter which also
violated the requirements imposed on the landlord by the Option to Extend, because the
Landlord: (1) gave Tenant only four days, until March 20, 1998, to respond, not 30 days as
required by the Option to Extend; (2) allocated "weights" to the allegedly comparable rentals,
in order to conveniently arrive at a higher proposed new Basic Rent, contrary to the Option
to Extend, which contained no provision for "weighting" the comparables; (3) continued to
insist on annual escalations in rent for each year of the 3-year extension term, in violation
of the express terms of the Option to Extend, which provided for the "new Basic Rent" to be
locked in at the "then prevailing market rates" as of the date of the extension; (4) demanded
an average yearly new Basic Rent of $18.00 per square foot, whereas the rental rate in the
Landlord's own building, (the primary "comparable" expressly required to be used by the
Option to Extend), according to Landlord's letter itself, was $17.00 per square foot; and (5)
still refused to offer comparable relocation premises in the event of nonrenewal, as required
in the original Lease. (R. 57-60)
The Landlord's March 16, 1998 letter implemented the Landlord's plan to provide the
Tenant with "an offer you can't accept," because by that time, the Landlord had already
leased the premises to Access Long Distance. (R. 733, TJ18YAddendum Exhibit 4) Access
Long Distance, under its new name of McLeod USA, presently occupies the premises
formerly rented by Appellant Tenant.
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By letter dated March 25, 1998, Tenant strenuously objected to the Landlord's
apparent attempt to make it impossible for the Tenant to exercise of the Option to Extend.
(R. 62-64VAddendum Exhibit 7) The Tenant reiterated the inadequacies of the Landlord's
February 10 and March 16 responses. (R. 63-64) In order to assure that Tenant did not reject
a reasonable "new Basic Rent," however, the Tenant stated that since according to the
Landlord, the Landlord's other tenants in the building paid $17.00 per square foot, compared
to the Tenant's original lease rate of $16.15 per square foot, therefore,
"effective July 1, 1998, and continuously monthly thereafter, Tenant shall pay
as and for basic rents the sum of $17.00 per square foot for the following 36
months, and all other terms, provisions, and conditions of the Lease shall be
and remain in full force and effect." (R. 64)(emphasis added)
The Tenant thus did not reject a properly formulated "new Basic Rent," but given the
Landlord's bad faith responses to the Tenant's exercise of the Option to Extend, Tenant
instead sought to arrive at a reasonable "new Basic Rent" for the extension term. (R. 733,
H19YAddendum Exhibit 4)
The Tenant paid rent on a timely basis for the months of March, April, May and June
of 1998 remaining on the original lease, and also tendered payments at the rate of $17.00 per
square foot for subsequent months, although such subsequent payments were returned by the
Landlord. (R. 733, ^20YAddendum Exhibit 4) Instead, by letter dated April 27, 1998, the
Landlord asserted that "Under the terms of the lease, [the Tenant] must accept the market
rental rate established by the landlord or rescind its election to extend the lease term." (R.
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66-67)(Addendum Exhibit 8) The Landlord took the position that "If Insure-FLite did not
agree with the market rate proposed by Parkside its remedy was to find new leased space."
(R. 758) That, apparently, was what the Landlord intended all along.
Landlord Appellee Parkside should not be allowed to profit from its malfeasance.
Since Insure-Rite, Inc. was in lawful possession when it exercised the Option to Extend, it
"cannot justly be treated as a trespasser." Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products,
Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 192, 515 P.2d 446, 449 (1973)(occupant in possession pursuant to an
invalid lease is not a trespasser). The terms of the relationship between Parkside and InsureRite, Inc. after the expiration of the original lease term, for purposes of a Notice to Quit, are
determined from the particular facts giving rise to the controversy to arrive "at what is fair
and reasonable in adjustment of the rights of the parties." Thomas J. Peck & S ons. Inc. v.
Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d at 193, 515 P.2d at 449 (implying a year-to-year lease
because invalid proposed lease was on a yearly basis for five years with option to renew).
Thus, under this third alternative ground, reflecting the parties1 month-to-month
Holdover Tenant provision, the lease between Parkside and Insure-Rite, Inc., at minimum,
was extended by operation of law on a month-to-month periodic basis. (R. 34) The Tenant's
provision of the $17.00 per-square-foot rent was reasonable under such circumstances, since
that was the average rate in the Landlord's own building, and also since the Landlord
ultimately accepted the $17.00 rate as damages. (R. 1477, p.15, lines 5-13)(hearing transcript
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excerpts attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 10) The Landlord therefore was required to
provide Tenant with a 15-day Notice to Quit under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(b)(i) in
order to terminate such resulting month-to-month tenancy. Alternatively, Insure-Rite, Inc.
became a "tenant at will," and Landlord Parkside was required to provide a 5-day Notice to
Quit under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(b)(ii). The landlord's 3-day Notice to Quit was
insufficient under either section. (R. 69)
2.

Since the Landlord's Notice to Quit did not satisfy the requirements of any
of the types of Notices to Quit provided by statute, the trial court should
have dismissed the Landlord's action

The Notice to Quit served by the Landlord herein was merely a 3-day notice, and also
did not provide for the alternative of payment of overdue rent. (R. 69) Such notice did not
satisfy the requirements of any of the Notices to Quit provided for in the Unlawful Detainer
statute. Where a tenancy has not been terminated by a proper Notice to Quit, a court must
dismiss the landlord's Unlawful Detainer suit on the ground that there is no cause of action.
Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852, 854 (Utah 1979) quoting Carstensen v. Hansen, 107
Utah 234, 237, 152 P.2d 954, 956 (1944)(Wolfe, C.J, concurring). Tenant Appellant InsureRite, Inc. appeared specially below and moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 554-557) The Tenant repeated
its objection on this ground through subsequent Oppositions to the landlord's motions for
summary judgment, all to no avail. (R. 708-752; 918-963 )
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The trial court should have dismissed the Landlord's action for failure to state a claim.
Accordingly, the judgment and all other rulings below should be reversed.
B.

The Summons served upon the Tenant by the Landlord was not "indorsed" or
"changed in form" by the trial court as required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8,
so the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Tenant
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-8 provides that in Unlawful Detainer actions:

,f

... The court shall indorse on the summons the number of days within which
the defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which shall not be
less than three or more than 20 days from the date of service. . . . The
summons shall be changed in form to conform to the time of service as
ordered, and shall be served as in other cases." (Emphasis added)
On July 20, 1998, upon Ex Parte Motion, Landlord Parkside obtained from the trial
court an "Order Shortening Time to Answer Complaint" from twenty (20) to seven (7) days.
(R. 76-77) The Landlord served the Tenant the following day, on July 21, 1998, but
voluntarily withdrew such service when confronted with the Tenant's challenge to the
defective Summons. (R. 92-97) On July 27, 1998, the Landlord tried again, serving the
Tenant with a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer (R. 1-73), the Order Shortening Time to
Answer Complaint (R. 76-77), and a second Summons. (R. 89-91)(Addendum Exhibit 11)
The trial court did not "indorse on the summons the number of days within which the
defendant [was] required to appear and defend the action," nor did the trial court change the
Summons "to conform to the time of service as ordered," as required by UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-36-8. (R. 89-91) A court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the summons
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served on the defendant does not contain a statutorily required indorsement. Fowler v. Seiten
838 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8 requires that summons
in unlawful detainer action must be indorsed by the court); cf. Dynapac, Inc. v. Innovations,
Inc., 550 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1976)(process servers failure to indorse date and time of
service rendered summons "fatally defective"; court obtained no personal jurisdiction over
defendant). The tenant by special appearance at its first opportunity, and subsequently by
similar special appearances, raised the defense of failure to obtain the court's indorsement
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8: (1) the Tenant appeared specially and moved to quash the
summons for insufficiency of process pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) (R.
98-99); (2) the Tenant appeared specially and moved to dismiss the action for Insufficiency
of Process under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and for lack of jurisdiction over the
person under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) (R. 554-557); and (3) the Tenant
appeared specially and renewed this objection in its Opposition to the Landlord's Motions
for Summary Judgment. (R. 708-752; 918-963) The trial court in each instance, however,
erroneously refused to dismiss the Landlord's action.
The Landlord cannot successfully contend that the separate "Order Shortening Time
to Answer Complaint" which the Landlord obtained on ex parte motion to the trial court prior
to commencement of the unlawful detainer proceeding satisfies the requirements of law. (R.
76-77) First, in Utah the landlord remedy of Unlawful Detainer is strictly construed:
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"The unlawful detainer statute is a summary proceeding and in derogation of the
common law. It provides a severe remedy, and this Court has previously held that it
must be strictly complied with before the cause of action may be maintained."
Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852, 853 (Utah 1979)(notice to quit defective because did
not notify tenant that it had the right to pay delinquent rent)(emphasis added); see also Cache
County v. Beus, 978 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(landlordfs notice defective
because contained no expression of "remedy or quit" as the statute requires, but merely noted
that "no payments were made," and ordered tenant to surrender possession).
Accordingly, the provisions for unlawful detainer proceedings in Utah must be strictly
obeyed.
Second, the plain language of statutes controls. Utah Dept. of Environmental Quality
v. Wind River Petroleum, 881 P.2d 869, 872-73 (Utah 1994). The Utah Unlawful Detainer
Statute unambiguously provides that, "[t]he court shall indorse on the summons the number
of days within which the defendant is required to appear and defend the action" and that
"[t]he summons shall be changed in form to conform to the time of service as ordered." Utah
Code Annotated § 78-36-8 (emphasis added). The statute plainly refers to indorsement of the
summons itself, not to the issuance of a separate order on an ex parte motion.
Third, a summons is special: it is the document that uniquely compels the defendant
to respond to the complaint, and since it requires an affirmative response at the risk of
suffering a default judgment, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the requirements for the
content of a summons must be strictly followed. See e.g., Dynapac, Inc. v. Innovations, Inc.,
550 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1976)(process server failure to indorse date and time of service
rendered summons "fatally defective").
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Fourth, it is particularly critical that the statutory requirements for shortening time for
defendants to appear and defend an action should be strictly followed in Unlawful Detainer
proceedings. The legislature has carefully balanced landlords' and tenants1 rights:
(1) (Tenants' Side) A landlord can no longer use self-help to remove a tenant. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-36-12 (2) (Landlords' Side) In exchange, however, landlords have been provided
with a summary proceeding whereby through the posting of a Possession Bond, landlords
can quickly recover possession of the premises. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8.5 (3) (Tenants'
Side) Tenants can nevertheless post a Renter's Counter-Bond, "trumping" the landlord's
possession bond, thereby allowing tenants to remain on the property. UTAH CODE ANN. § 7836-8.5 (4) (Landlord's Side) UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8 allows landlords to shorten the time
within which tenants must appear and defend the action-or risk default judgment-from the
ordinary 20-day time to respond, to a mere three days. Failure to require strict compliance
with the requirements for indorsement of the summons by the court in unlawful detainer
proceedings would tilt the scales in favor of landlords, destroying the delicate statutory
balance between landlords' and tenants' rights which the Utah legislature has crafted. If any
change were needed, it should come from the legislature.
Landlord Parkside did not comply with the statutory requirements for indorsement and
changes to the Summons, so the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Tenant InsureRite, Inc., and the judgment and all other rulings below should be reversed.
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POINT II
IN GRANTING THE LANDLORDS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION AND DAMAGES, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED BY PROCEEDING WITHOUT PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER THE TENANT, BY DECIDING ISSUES OF
FACT, AND BY TREBLING DAMAGES 3
A,

The trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Tenant
As discussed under Point I, the Landlord failed to state a claim for relief because of

the defective Notice to Quit and, moreover, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over
the Tenant because the Summons, was not properly indorsed or changed by the court. The
Tenant repeatedly raised these objections in its Oppositions to the Landlord's motions for
summary judgment. The trial court therefore erred in granting such motions.
B.

The trial court erroneously decided genuine issues of material fact on summary
judgment
Summary judgment is properly granted only when there are no genuine issues of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. UTAH R.CIV.P.

3

. The trial court denied the Tenant's Motion to Quash Summons Served on July
27, 1998 and Motion to Dismiss the action, either of which would have deprived the
court of jurisdiction as a matter of law. Also, as a matter of law, the trial court is
precluded from deciding issues of fact. Utah R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c). Moreover, in this case
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10(3) precludes treble damages because the Tenant was not in
"unlawful detainer". The standard of review for these issues therefore is the "correction of
error" standard, for which no deference is due the trial court. Ong International (U.S.A.)
Inc.v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d
675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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56(c); Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 (Utah 1992). Because summary judgment
deprives the losing party of a trial on the merits, appellate courts view the facts and
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party. Nymanv.
McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
In addition to the express obligations under the lease, the Landlord had an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and
Livestock Co.. Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 1985)(duty of good faith and fair dealing
with respect to option to extend contract for oil and gas rights). The implied term of good
faith and fair dealing is as much a part of the lease as those terms that are expressed. Coulter
& Smith, Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998)(option to purchase real estate).
Whether there has been a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a
factual issue. The Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Ut. Ct. App.
1994)(summary judgment reversed).
1.

Issues of fact improperly decided in summary judgment for possession

In granting the Landlord's motion for summary judgment for possession, the trial court
erroneously decided disputed genuine issues of material fact. The trial court below candidly
acknowledged that there were disputed genuine issues of material fact:
"I mean, there are very few issues of fact here, obviously."
(R. 1037, p.2, lines 22-23)(Addendum Exhibit 13Vemphasis added)
Indeed, there were numerous genuine issues of material fact, both under the express
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terms of the Option to Extend and under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
including: (1) Did the Landlord's February 10, 1998, response breach the terms of the Option
to Extend or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by proposing an entirely new
lease instead of responding with an appropriately formulated f,new Basic Rent"? (2) Did such
response breach such duties because it contained annual escalations in rent for each year of
the three-year extension term, contrary to the Option to Extend, which provided for the "new
Basic Rent" to be locked in at the "then prevailing market rates" as of the date of the
extension? (3) Did such response breach such duties by omitting consideration of the lower
comparable rentals in the Landlord's own Parkside Tower building in determining the new
Basic Rent, as expressly required by the Option to Extend? (4) Did such response breach
such duties by demanding that the Tenant pay for all of its own parking spaces, whereas
under the original Lease, the Tenant received 5 free parking spaces, which had a value of
approximately $10,000 over the 3-year extension (5) Did such response breach such duties
by refusing to offer comparable relocation premises in the event of nonrenewal, as required
by the original lease? (6) Did the Landlord's March 16, 1998 response, submitted thirty-eight
days after Tenant had exercised the Option to Extend, breach the express terms of the lease
or the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, since the Option to Extend required the
Landlord to respond within 30 days to the Tenant's exercise of the Option? (7) Did such
second response breach such duties by giving the Tenant only four days, until March 20,
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1998, to respond, not 30 days as required by the Option to Extend? (8) Did such second
response breach such duties by allocating "weights" to the allegedly comparable rentals, in
order to arrive at a higher proposed new Basic Rent, contrary to the Option to Extend, which
contained no provision for "weighting" the comparables? (9) Did such second response
breach such duties by continuing to insist on annual escalations in rent for each year of the
three-year extension term, in violation of the express terms of the Option to Extend, which
provided for the "new Basic Rent" to be locked in at the "then prevailing market rates" as of
the date of the extension? (10) Did such second response breach such duties by demanding
an average yearly new Basic Rent of $18.00 per square foot, whereas the rental rate in the
Landlord's own building, according to Landlord's letter itself, was $17.00 per square foot?
(11) Did such second response breach such duties by continuing to refuse to offer
comparable relocation premises in the event of nonrenewal, as required in the original Lease?
(12) Did the Landlord's conduct breach such duties by implementing a plan to provide the
Tenant with "an offer you can't accept," in order to evict the Tenant and lease the premises
to Access Long Distance? (13) Did the Landlord breach such duties by rejecting the Tenant's
tender of rent at $17.00 per square foot, the average amount charged to other tenants in the
Landlord's building, compared to the Tenant's original lease rate of $16.15 per square foot?
The trial court recognized that such issues of fact existed regarding the meaning of
the Option to Extend when it asked counsel for the Landlord:
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"Well, tell me before you step down, in that case, what does the language
Incomparable size, similar terms, similar credit worthy tenant, first by
reference to the building, second to the other similar buildings in Downtown
Salt Lake,['] what does that suppose to mean if you can't use it to see whether
or not the market rate is fair?" [sic]
(R. 1037, p.3, lines 16-22XAddendum Exhibit 13Xemphasis added)
Instead of allowing the Tenant a trial on the merits, the trial court proceeded to decide
these issues on summary judgment:
"THE COURT:... I'm granting the motion for partial summary judgment. The
reason is this phrase, sentence, which I think is the key to the whole case and
the renewal of an option, which is 'Market rate as used by landlord to
determine the new basic rent shall be the rental rate.' The reason this is not a
formula which can result in an exact calculation no matter what an appraiser
says or anybody else — had it specifically identified buildings, specific
buildings, specific floors, specific configurations or minimum and maximum
square footage, maybe we could get there. But my ruling is what this does is
about what [Landlord's counsel] said it does, that is it requires fairness.
Somebody couldn't - the landlord couldn't have said 30 bucks, the same way
the tenant couldn't have come back with two bucks. It says there's got to be a
fair market price. We are talking about a range. There is no question in my
mind but that $18 falls within the fair range that we are talking about. That
being the case, it doesn't matter whether the February 10 letter or the March
16th letter is the notification to the Defendant of the new rate. They both say
$18 a foot, thefirstone somewhat ambiguous, the second one not ambiguous
at all. ..."
(R. 1040-1041, p. 15, lines 10-25; p. 16, lines 1- L2¥Addendum Exhibit 13yemphasis added)
Perhaps more than with respect to any other issue of fact, the Landlord and Tenant
profoundly disagreed about what the "new Basic Rent" for the 3-year extension term should
be: the Landlord in its February 10, 1998 and March 16, 1998 letters demanded, inter alia,
$18.00 per square foot, an 11% increase over the original lease rate, whereas the Tenant's
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expert contended it should be $17.00, a 5% increase. (R. 749) The trial court decided that
fundamental disputed genuine issue of material fact on summary judgment as well:
"There is no question in my mind but that $18 falls within the fair range that
we are talking about."
(R. 1040-1041, p. 15, lines 10-25; p. 16, lines 1-12YAddendum Exhibit 13¥emphasis added)
Since there were genuinely disputed issues of material fact, the trial court should have
denied summary judgment, not proceeded to decide such issues on summary judgment.
Munford v. Lee Servicing Co.. 999 P.2d 23, 26 n.7, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 108, ^ 14
(2000)(trial court erroneously decided factual issues on summary judgment which trial court
recognized as such). Whether the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was breached by
the Landlord was a quintessential^ factual issue precluding summary judgment. The
Republic Group. Inc. v. Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994)(good faith
a factual issue; summary judgment reversed).
2.

Issues of fact improperly decided in summary judgment for damages

Similarly, in granting the Landlord's motion for summary judgment for damages, the
trial court erroneously decided disputed genuine issues of material fact. The Landlord
contended through affidavits that the fair rental value for purposes of the adjudication of
damages was $18.00 per square foot per year, (R. 812, ^[6) whereas the Tenant contended
through affidavits that the proper value should be premised on the $16.15 per square foot per
year under the original lease. (R. 923-924) The trial court split the difference, concluding
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that the fair rental value was $17.00, and awarded the Landlord damages in that amount. (R.
1185) In doing so the trial court erroneously decided the genuinely disputed issue of material
fact regarding fair rental value. See Munford v. Lee Servicing Co., 999 P.2d 23, 28,
2000 Utah Ct. App. 108, If 27 (2000)(trial court erroneously decided which of two versions
of insurance policy was in effect).
The trial court was led astray by the Landlord's assertion that there was no disputed
issue of fact because the Tenant had proposed a "new Basic Rent" of $17.00 per square foot
per year. (R. 995) The Tenant's submittal of a $17.00 rate, however, was for purposes of the
"new Basic Rent" for the 3-year term extension (and which the Landlord refused when
tendered). In contrast, the issue before the trial court at the damages hearing was the "fair
rental value" to be assessed against a holdover tenant. The Landlord-and the trial courtconfused the question of "rent" with the question of "damages."
C.

The trial court erroneously trebled damages
Even if there had been no genuine issue of material fact precluding summary

judgment for damages, the trial court erred in trebling damages as a matter of law. First, and
as set out in Point I above, the Tenant was not in "unlawful detainer," and that was the only
possibly applicable ground for trebling damages under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10(3).
Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law, and its award of treble damages should
be reversed.
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Second, even if the Tenant had been in unlawful detainer, the treble damages
provision in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10(3) violates both the state and federal Due Process
Clauses. U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, Sec. 1; UTAH CONST, art. I, Sec. 7. When a damages
award is grossly excessive, in light of (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct, (2)
the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered and the damages award, and (3)
the difference between the remedy and other penalties authorized in comparable cases, it no
longer vindicates the State's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence and is violative
of due process. BMW of North America. Inc. v. Gore. 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996)(punitive
damages invalidated). These factors do not support the over $100,000 in damages assessed
against the Tenant for remaining in premises that otherwise would have been rented to the
Tenant but for the Landlord's bad faith conduct. (R. 991-996)(raising issue in trial court).

45

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STAY
ENFORCEMENT OF ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENTS, IN ITS GRANT
OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS TO THE LANDLORD, AND IN
DISMISSING THE TENANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRDPARTY COMPLAINT
A.

The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to stay enforcement of its
summary judgment rulings 4
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to stay the enforcement of its rulings

on summary judgment since the case raised serious questions regarding the propriety of the
Notice to Quit and the Summons. Moreover, the trial court was informed that the Tenant had
sought appellate review, by right and through petition for interlocutory review. The trial
court concluded, albeit erroneously, that the parties did not disagree that the Landlord should
receive $17.00 per square foot per year, and the Tenant had tendered such amount. Under
these circumstances, the trial court clearly abused its discretion in failing to stay its
judgments of eviction and damages.

4

. The standard of judicial review with respect to the trial couif s refusal to stay
enforcement of its rulings on summary judgment is "abuse of discretion." See UTAH
R.CIV.P. 62(a); Taylor National Inc. v. Jensen Brothers Construction Co., 641 P.2d 150,
154 (Utah 1982).
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B.

The trial court erred in granting attorneys fees and costs to the Landlord
1.

Award of attorneys fees and costs was improper because of the invalidity
of the underlying rulings on summary judgment5

As set out in Point I above, the Tenant was not in "unlawful detainer" so the Landlord
was not entitled to evict the Tenant or to impose damages. Since there was no breach by the
Tenant upon which a recovery by the Landlord of attorneys fees and costs could be based,
the trial court erred as a matter of law, and its award of attorneys fees and costs should be
reversed.
2.

Award of attorneys fees and costs was improper because the trial court
made no findings regarding the reasonableness of such fees and costs6

A trial court must set out findings demonstrating that its award of attorneys fees and
costs is reasonable. Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996)(fees must be
reasonable); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988)(fmdings required).
The trial court's record must be sufficient to permit appellate review of the appropriateness
of such awards. Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) The record
must show the trial court considered four factors: (1) What legal work was actually

5

. The Standard of Review with respect to the trial court's award of attorney fees
and costs is "correctness." No deference is due the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 936 (Utah 1994) (errors of law).
6

. The Standard of Review with respect to the trial court's award of attorneys fees
and costs is "clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988
(Utah 1988)(clear abuse of discretion).
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performed? (2) How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately
prosecute the matter? (3) Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily
charged in the locality for similar services? (4) Are there circumstances which require
consideration of additional factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional
Responsibility? Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990-91 (Utah 1988).
The trial court herein issued three orders awarding attorneys fees and costs to the
Landlord and its attorneys. (1) On July 19, 1999, the court awarded $33,823.50 (R. 13231324); (2) on February 11, 2000, the court awarded $7,998.00 (R. 1428-1430); and (3) on
May 18, 2000, the court awarded $7,710.00 (R. 1456-1458). Nowhere in those orders is
there any indication that the factors required by law were considered or met. Accordingly,
such awards were unlawful and should be reversed.
C.

The trial court erred in dismissing the Tenant's counterclaims and third-party
complaint7
The trial court erred in concluding that its grant of summary judgment for possession

to the Landlord had a res judicata effect on the Tenant's counterclaims against the Landlord
as well as on the Tenant's third-party claims against the real estate agent and real estate
brokerage involved in the transaction. (R. 1368-1369)

7

. The Standard of Review with respect to the trial court's dismissal of the Tenant's
counterclaims and third-party complaint is "correctness." No deference is due the trial
court. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (errors of law).
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The Tenant asserted the following counterclaims against the Landlord: Breach of
Contract, Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing, Fraud, Intentional
Interference With Existing and Prospective Economic Relations, Civil Conspiracy,
Constructive Eviction, violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, and Retaliatory
Eviction. (R. 612-707) The tenant asserted the following third-party claims against the real
estate agent and real estate brokerage involved in the transaction: Fraud, Intentional
Interference With Existing and Prospective Economic Relations, Civil Conspiracy and
violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. (R. 612-707) The trial court ruled that
its prior grant of the landlord's motion for summary judgment to evict the tenant precluded
all these claims. This is contrary to Utah law.
In Timmv. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Utah 1993) the Utah Supreme Court held
that a defendant's counterclaims are not precluded by the prior grant of summary judgment
to a plaintiff, unless such counterclaims were necessary to the ruling on summary judgment.
As set out in Points I and II above, the trial court erroneously granted the landlord summary
judgments against the tenant. Thus, the antecedent unlawful summary judgment rulings could
not support preclusion of the Tenant's counterclaims or third-party complaint.
Even assuming ex arguendo that the trial court properly granted summary judgment
for possession to the landlord because the tenant rejected the landlord's proposal for a whole
new lease, preclusion does not apply. A lease is both a conveyance and a contract, and
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whereas the parties' privity of estate may be terminated by an eviction, claims arising from
their contractual obligations remain. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 900
n.2 (1989). The trial court's eviction of the Tenant, even if lawful, therefore did not preclude
the Tenant's counterclaims against the Landlord which arosefromcontract, tort and statutory
obligations. A fortiori, such eviction of the Tenant could not preclude the Tenant's claims
against the Third-Party Defendants, with whom the Tenant was never in privity of estate.
Accordingly, the counterclaims and third-party claims were not "necessary" to the trial
court's summary judgment ruling evicting the tenant, and the trial court improper^ dismissed
such claims and third-party complaint.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the final judgment and all antecedent rulings by the trial
court. Appellees should be taxed with costs on appeal.
DATED this /,**• day of November 2000.

^OH^MART^i^^~-T
Attorney for Appellant-Tentem Insure-Rite, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Filed the original of the foregoing and nine copies with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court:
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
450 SOUTH STATE STREET, FIFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84111-1860
and served two copies of the foregoing upon each of the following:
Matthew N. Evans, Esq.
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(Attorneys for Appellee Landlord Parkside Salt Lake Corp.)
J. David Pearce
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
(Attorneys for Third Party Defendants-Appellees Collin Perkins and Wallace Associates)
viafirstclass mail, postage pre-paid, this ^#day of November 2000, addressed as set forth
above.
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit 1:

Lease (relevant provisions) (R. 7-13; 34; 49-50; 53)

Exhibit 2:

Tenant's February 6, 1998 letter exercising option (R. 204)

Exhibit 3:

Landlord's February 10, 1998 letter (R. 206-209)

Exhibit 4:

Kasteler Affidavit (R. 729-734)

Exhibit 5:

Tenant's March 5, 1998 letter (R. 55)

Exhibit 6:

Landlord's March 16, 1998 letter (R. 57-60)

Exhibit 7:

Tenant's March 25, 1998 letter (R. 62-64)

Exhibit 8:

Landlord's April 27, 1998 letter (R. 66-67)

Exhibit 9:

Notice to Quit (R. 69-70)

Exhibit 10: Hearing Transcript, March 1, 1999 (excerpts) (R. 1477)
Exhibit 11:

Summons served on July 27, 1998 (R. 105-106)

Exhibit 12: Hearing Transcript, October 26, 1998 (excerpts) (R. 1044-1048)
Exhibit 13: Hearing Transcript, November 13, 1998 (excerpts) (R. 1037-1042)
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OFFICE LEASE
THIS OFFICE LEASE (this "Lease") is made this 18th day of
February, 1997, between, PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation ("Landlord"), and, INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah
corporation ("Tenant").
LEASE OF PREMISES
Landlord hereby leases to Tenant and Tenant hereby leases
from Landlord, on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth,
those premises (the "Premises") set forth in Item 2 of the Basic
Lease Provisions and shown in the drawing attached hereto as
Exhibit "B", which Premises are a part of that office building
(the "Building") identified in Item 1 of the Basic Lease
Provisions and situated on that certain real property described
in Exhibit "A" attached hereto (the "Property"),
BASIC LEASE PROVISIONS

2.

Building Name and Address:

Parkside Tower Building
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Premises:

The space on the 4th floor,
suite 450, as shown on
Exhibit "B".
Approximately 5,037 square
feet.
Approximately 4,342 square
feet.

Rentable Area:
Usable Area:
Basic Annual Rent:
Monthly Installments:

$81,347.55
$ 6,778.96
Based on a rate of $16.15
per year per square foot of
Rentable Area.

Tenant's Percentage:
Base Year:

2.7%
1992

Scheduled Commencement
Date:

May 1, 1997

6,

Expiration Date:

June 30, 1998

7,

Tenant Improvement
Allowance:

n/a

8,

Security Deposit:

$

9,

Guarantor(s):

1

Tenant's Broker:
Landlord's Broker:

n/a
Wallace Associates/
Collin Perkins

AGENCY DISCLOSURE: At the signing of this Lease, the
listing agent represents Landlord, and the leasing agent
represents Tenant. Landlord and Tenant each confirm that
prior to signing this Lease, this agency disclosure was
acknowledged by both parties.
(
) Landlord's Initials
Tenant's Initials

(AT

General office purposes,

Use of premises:
Address for Payments
and Notices:
Landlord:

Payments and Local Notices
Wallace Associates
215 S. State, Suite 960
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attention: Steve Koch
Notices
American Realty Advisors
Agent for:
Parkside Salt Lake Corp.
700 N. Brand Boulevard,
Suite 300
Glendale, California 91205
Attn: Glenn Girsberger
Notices

Tenant:

Insure-Rite, Inc.
215 S. State, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 34111
Attn: Richard Kasteler

2
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this
Lease, consisting of the foregoing provisions and Sections 1 through 28
of the Additional Lease Provisions which follow, together with Exhibits
"A11 through "H" incorporated herein by this reference, as of the date
first above written.
LANDLORD:
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORPORATION

C-*jJy>*

By:
Glenn H. Girsberger, Asset Manager
f/2^J^

Its:

Date:

Date:

^

<//<??
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ADDITIONAL LEASE PROVISIONS
SECTION 1 .

RENTABLE AREA OF PREMISES

The Rentable Area of the Premises is provided in Item 2
of the Basic Lease Provisions. For the purpose of this Lease,
"Rentable Area" is calculated pursuant to the Standard Method for
Measuring Floor Area of Office Buildings, ANSI 265.1-1980,
commonly known as the "BOMA standard."
SECTION 2.

TERM —

COMMENCEMENT DATE AND EXPIRATION DATE

The term of this Lease shall commence on the earlier of
(a) the date on which the Premises are delivered to Tenant with
all tenant improvements that are Landlord7 s responsibility
substantially completed as provided in Section 7.3 and Exhibit
"D", other than punch list items, or (b) the date on which Tenant
first takes possession of the Premises. Landlord shall cause the
tenant improvements for which Landlord is responsible to be
constructed in a good, workmanlike manner and shall endeavor to
have such tenant improvements substantially completed on or
before the Scheduled Commencement Date. If Landlord is unable to
deliver possession of the Premises to Tenant on or before the
Scheduled Commencement Date, this Lease shall not be void or
voidable, but rather, shall remain in full force and effect
except as otherwise provided in this Section 2. Landlord shall
not be subject to any liability to Tenant for any loss or damage
resulting from such non-delivery and Tenant's obligations
hereunder shall not be affected thereby. If Landlord is unable
to deliver possession of the Premises to Tenant within one (1)
year after the Scheduled Commencement Date, this Lease shall
automatically terminate, and Landlord shall not, by reason
thereof, be subject to any liability except that Landlord shall
return to Tenant all monies which Landlord has theretofore
received from Tenant as prepaid rent or as a security deposit,
without interest; provided, however, Tenant's occupancy of the
Premises at any time shall conclusively be deemed 'a waiver of
this provision. The term of this Lease shall, unless this Lease
is terminated sooner as provided herein, end on the "Expiration
Date" as provided in Item 6 of the Basic Lease Provisions and
shall not be extended by any such delay. The date upon which the
term of this Lease actually commences shall hereafter be referred
to as the "Commencement Date." The period from the Commencement
Date through the Expiration Date is the "Lease Term," unless it
is sooner terminated as provided herein. Within thirty (30) days
after the Commencement Date, Landlord and Tenant shall execute
the memorandum attached hereto as Exhibit "C", but failure to do
so shall not affect Tenant's obligations under this Lease.
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SECTION 20.

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Tenant shall faithfully observe and strictly comply with
the rules and regulations set forth in Exhibit "E" hereto. Said
rules and regulations may be deleted, amended or supplemented by
Landlord from time to time with such other rules and regulations
as Landlord may reasonably adopt for the safety, care, and
cleanliness of the Building and the Property and the facilities
thereof, or the preservation of good order therein. Landlord
shall not be liable to Tenant for violation by any other tenant
in the Building of any such rules and regulations, or for breach
of any covenant or condition in any lease. Landlord has not
represented and is not hereby representing that all tenants in
the Building are or shall be bound to any part or all of such
rules and regulations.
SECTION 21.

SURRENDER OF PREMISES

Upon the expiration or sooner termination of the term of
this Lease, Tenant shall surrender the Premises in as good
condition as when received, reasonable wear and tear excepted,
broom clean and free of trash and rubbish, and free from all
tenancies or occupancies by any person. Tenant shall remove all
trade fixtures, furniture, equipment and other personal property
installed in the Premises prior to the expiration or earlier
termination of this Lease. Tenant shall, at its own cost,
completely repair any and all damage to the Premises and the
Building resulting from or caused by such removal. If Tenant
fails to remove such items upon the expiration of this Lease, the
same shall be deemed abandoned and shall become the property of
Landlord. Landlord shall not be deemed to have accepted any
surrender of the Premises to Landlord prior to the end of the
Lease Term, unless Landlord has agreed and acknowledged, in
writing, that it has accepted such surrender.
SECTION 22.

HOLDING OVER

Should Tenant, with or without Landlord's written
consent, hold over after the expiration of this Lease, Tenant
shall pay, in advance, monthly rent at the rate of two hundred
percent (200%) of one month's Basic Annual Rent, plus all
Additional Rent provided by this Lease.
SECTION 23.

NOTICES

Any notice required or permitted to be given hereunder
shall be in writing and shall be deemed effective either upon
personal delivery, or receipt thereof when deposited in the
United States mail, registered or certified delivery, return
receipt requested, addressed to the Tenant at the Premises or to
Landlord or Tenant at the location stated in Item 12 of the Basic
Lease Provisions. Either party may specify a different address
for notice purposes in the manner aforesaid. A copy of all
notices to be given to Landlord hereunder shall be concurrently
25
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EXHIBIT "Gn
PARKING PROVISIONS
1.
Capitalized terms used but not defined in this
Exhibit shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Office
Lease (the "Lease") to which this Exhibit is attached.
2.
Subject to the terms and conditions of this Exhibit,
Landlord shall issue Tenant parking passes (individually, a
"Pass" and collectively, the "Passes") for the parking facilities
owned by Landlord in connection with the Building (the
"Facilities") in such numbers as Tenant may request, up to the
maximum number of two (2) Passes for reserved parking and ten
(10) Passes for unreserved parking outstanding to Tenant at any
given time. Unreserved parking shall be designated as parking in
the parking garage rather or the surface parking lot both of
which constitute part of the Facility. Each Pass shall, during
the time it is in effect, entitle Tenant to park one vehicle in
the type of parking stall designated in the Pass; provided Passes
for unreserved parking shall be subject to the availability of
parking spaces. Tenant acknowledges that in order for Landlord
to fully utilize the Facilities, and to facilitate the providing
of parking to clients and visitors of tenants of the Building,
Landlord will make estimates and predictions as to the numbers of
Passes for unreserved parking that will be used on each day and
at any given time, and permit others to use the Facilities based
upon such estimates and predictions. On occasion, and from time
to time, unanticipated usage of the Facilities may result in
parking spaces being unavailable for the holders of Passes for
unreserved parking. If, however, on a frequent and recurring
basis, there are no unreserved parking spaces available to the
holders of Tenant's Passes for unreserved parking, Landlord will,
at Tenant's written request, make reasonable adjustments to
Landlord's parking policies and practices in order to limit the
occurrence of such problems to an occasional basis.
3.
Prior to the first day of each month, Tenant shall'
pay Landlord the monthly parking fee, which at the commencement
of this Lease is set at $55.00 per month, per Pass for unreserved
Passes and $80.00 per month, per Pass for reserved Passes,
subject to periodic adjustments, for each Pass that will be
outstanding to Tenant during such month. If such fee is not paid
when due with respect to any Pass, such Pass shall immediately
become null and void and Tenant shall promptly return such Pass
to Landlord. Landlord may, in its discretion, increase such fees
G-l
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at any time and from time to time so long as the fees charged for
the Passes are reasonably competitive with rates being charged at
the time for similar parking in the general area of the Building.
Notwithstanding the preceding, five (5) of the above aentiojaed
unreserved parlcing Passes shall be free of charge»
4.
Tenant's rights under this Exhibit shall terminate
and Tenant shall promptly return to Landlord all outstanding
Passes issued to it upon the occurrence of either of the
following: (i) the last day of the Lease Term; or (ii) any
default or breach on the part of Tenant under the Lease or this
Exhibit.
5.
The parking rights granted to Tenant under this
Exhibit or under the Passes shall be deemed a license only and
nothing in this Exhibit or the Passes shall be construed as
granting to or vesting in Tenant any fee, leasehold or other
interest in the Facilities other than a license which is subject
to termination as provided in this Exhibit.
6.
Landlord's inability to make parking available at
any time to holders of the Passes shall not be deemed to be a
breach or default on the part of Landlord under the Lease or
under this Exhibit so long as such inability is due to fire,
flood, earthquake, strikes, riots, blackouts, condemnation and
other casualties or causes reasonably beyond Landlord's control.
The abatement of Tenant's obligation to pay parking fees for the
Passes during any such period for which parking is unavailable
shall constitute Tenant's sole remedy in the event of such
unavailability.
7.
Tenant may permit its personnel to use Passes issued
to Tenant pursuant to this Exhibit, provided Tenant shall
maintain on file with Landlord at all times a current list of
each of Tenant's personnel permitted to use a Pass. Only one of
Tenant's personnel at any given time shall be assigned to a given
Pass and only that person may use such Pass. Tenant shall be
fully responsible to Landlord to assure that each of Tenant's
personnel whom Tenant permits to use a Pass fully complies with
the terms and conditions of this Exhibit and shall be liable to
Landlord for any failure of any of Tenant's personnel to so
comply. Landlord may deal directly with those persons designated
by Tenant as authorized to use the Passes with regard to such
matters as the renewal of Passes and the collection of monthly
parking fees, and no such direct dealings shall relieve Tenant of
any of its duties or obligation hereunder.
G-2
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RENEWAL OPTION
Provided Tenant has not defaulted under this Lease, and that this
Lease is in full force and effect at the time Tenant exercises
the option to extend as provided herein, then Tenant shall have
the option (the "Option to Extend") to extend the term of this
Lease for an additional period of three (3) years (the "Extension
Term"), upon the same terms and conditions except Basic Rent
shall be adjusted to the then prevailing market rates, commencing
on the day after the Expiration Date of this Lease. The Option
to Extend must be exercised by written notice delivered by Tenant
to Landlord at any time prior to March 1, 1998. Thirty days
after Tenant notifies Landlord it is exercising its option,
Landlord must provide Tenant with written notice of the new
rental. "Market rate", as used by Landlord to determine the new
Basic Rent, shall be the rental rate for comparable space of
comparable size for a similar term for a similar credit-worthy
tenant by reference first to the Building and second to the other
similar buildings in downtown Salt Lake City. Tenant may reject
the new rental rate for a period of 3 0 days following notice from
the Landlord, at which time Tenant's exercise of its Option to
Extend shall be null and void. If Tenant does not notify
Landlord within 3 0 days of Landlord's notice to Tenant of the new
rental rate, then Tenant shall automatically be deemed to have
accepted the market rental rate in the notice.
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MEMORANDUM
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TO:

XRCOLLEs PERKINS
VLAFAX
FROM:
G. RICHARD KASTELER
SUBJECT: EXERCISING LEASING OPTION
DATE:
02/06/93
CC:

WELDEN DAHMES, CFO

PLEASE EXCUSE THE DELAY LN SENDING THIS FAX TO YOU. AS PER YOUR
INSTRUCTIONS INSURE-RITE, LNC. * WOULD LIKE TO EXERCISE OUR OPTION FOR
THE REMAINING THREE YEARS OF OUR LEASE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT
FTNALIZATION OF THIS OPTION WILL DEPEND ON THE LEASE RATE THAT WILL
BE PRESENTED.
THANK. YOU FOR YOURHELP!

!15 South 3tate -Suite 401 • Salt Lak? City. Utan 8 4 m

M 8 0 1 ) 531-0?31 • Fa.-: (SOU 53! -031!

EXHIBIT 3

MWallace Associates
Property Solutions Worldwide*

Hand Delivered and Received on February II, 1998
February 10, 1998
Mr. Richard Kasteller
Insure-Rite, Inc.
215 S. State, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RE:

PARKSIDE TOWER LEASE RENEWAL PROPOSAL

Dear Richard:
Pursuant to the Renewal Option in your lease and your notice dated February 6, 1998 to exercise
said Option, the following is an outline for a lease renewal proposal for your leased Premises
containing approximately 4,408 usable square feet or 5,037 rentable square feet and located on
the 4th floor of the building known as Parkside Tower, 215 S. State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
floorplan enclosed. (See Exhibit "A")
Landlord:

Parkside Salt Lake Corporation

Tenant:

Insure-Rite, Inc.

Lease Term:

3 years

Lease Commencement:

July 1, 1998

Minimum Annual
Rent:

Rental Rate/Sq.Ft.
S17.50
$18.00
$18.50

Period
Yearl
Year 2
Year 3

Effective Rate Over
Term (p.s.f.):

$18.00 (See Exhibit "B" for

Load Factor:

1.16

Tenant Improvement
Allowance:

Landlord to provide up to $3.00 per usable square foot,
subject to review of plans and specifications, for the
purpose of improving the Premises. Said allowance
includes construction management fees, space planning
and working drawings to be coordinated by Landlord's
architect, if necessary.

Parking:

Tenant shall be granted a total of twelve (12) parking
stalls in the building parking structure and lot. Out of the
total parking allotment, ten (10) parking stalls shall be
unreserved and two (2) parking stalls shall be reserved.
The cost of the parking stalls in the building parking
structure and lot shall be at the rate of $55.00 per month,
per stall, for unreserved stalls and $80.00 per month, per
stall, for reserved stalls, subject to periodic market
adjustments.

Operating Expenses:

Base year to remain the same as in existing lease.

Confidential:

Tenant acknowledges that the terms and conditions
contained herein and details of the ensuing negotiations
will remain confidential between the parties to the lease
and no proposals, lease drafts, leases or summaries of any
kind will be distributed, copied, or otherwise transmitted,
orally or in writing to any other entity or person.

This lease proposal is a solicitation for an offer and does not constitute and shall not be deemed
an offer. In accordance herewith, Landlord reserves the right to issue lease proposals with
respect to the same premises to any number of parties at any one time and from time to time, the
terms and conditions of each individual lease proposal to be determined, and to differ as deemed
appropriate, by Landlord at its sole discretion.
Tenant's execution and delivery of this lease proposal and any further negotiation of a lease,
including without limitation, Tenant's execution and delivery of a proposed lease agreement,
shall in no way effect a contract to lease or to enter into a lease or bind Landlord in any way, but
shall be deemed to be an offer to lease the premises described herein upon the terms and
conditions described herein or subsequently described in any proposed lease agreement executed
and delivered by Tenant. Only upon Landlord's execution and delivery of a lease agreement shall
such offer be deemed accepted and shall a valid and binding lease exist.

f.O
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At any time prior to such execution and delivery of a lease agreement by Landlord, Landlord
shall be have the right without any recourse by Tenant to: (i) conduct simultaneous negotiations
with any third party or parties for the leasing of the same premises; (ii) cease lease negotiations
with Tenant; and (iii) enter into a lease agreement with any third party covering the same
premises, the terms and conditions of such lease agreement to be as deemed appropriate by
Landlord at its sole discretion. The terms proposed herein shall be valid through March 9,1998
by 3:00 pm MST.
It is understood that Collin Perkins of Grubb & EllisjWallace Associates represents the Landlord
and the principal parties agree thereto.
If the preceding offer is acceptable to you, please sign and return an acknowledged copy of this
proposal so we may begin drafting the lease document.
Should you have any questions regarding this proposal, please contact me at 579-3270.
Yours truly,

Collin Perkins
Office Services Group
cc:

Gerald Goldman, American Realty Advisors

ACCEPTED THIS

DAY OF

1998.

BY:

FOR:

n o ::• •" 3

EXHIBIT "A"
COMPARABLE BUILDINGS AND LEASE COMPS
TENANT
SIZE

EFFECTIVE
RATE

1. City Center I -175 East 400 South
Tenant: Property Research Group
5 years, March, 1997

7,000 sf

$19.50/sf

2. 185 S. State
Tenant: Kinross Gold
3 years, July 1997

3,510 sf

$17.50/sf

3. Broadway Center -111 East Broadway
Tenant: Watkiss Dunning & Watkiss
5 years, November, 1997

7,134 sf

$17.00/sf

Average Effective Rate:

S18.00/sf

EXHIBIT 4

NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696)
JOHN T. GIANNOPOULOS (# 7209)
Attorneys at Law
466 South 400 East, # 100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3325
Tele: (801) 521-4441
Fax: (801) 521-4452
Attorneys for Defendant
Insure-Rite, Inc.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP.
a Utah, corporation,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT BY
G. RICHARD KASTELER IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
INSURE-RITE, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

INSURE-RITE, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

Case No.:

98 09 06982

Judge: Stephen L. Henriod

Plaintiff,
v.
COLLIN PERKINS, an
individual, and WALLACE
ASSOCIATES,.
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

C:\WPDOCS\ins\parkside v m s u r e r i t e
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G. RICHARD KASTELER, first duly sworn upon his oath
deposes and says:
1.

He is the president and chief executive officer of Insure-

Rite Inc., a Utah Corporation, and the named Defendant hereinabove.
2. That the statements made herein are made upon affiant fs
personal knowledge.
3. That the facts stated hereinbelow

are admissible in

evidence, and that affiant is competent to testify as to all
matters stated herein.
4. The negotiations relating to the execution of the Lease,
and the negotiations relating to Defendant's exercise of its
Renewal Option were conducted by him or he supervised the same in
behalf of the Defendant.
5. He had personal interaction with Collin Perkins and Lori
Ostlind.
6. On or about February 18, 1997, Plaintiff as the Landlord,
and Defendant as the Tenant, entered into a lease agreement (the
"Lease") for those certain commercial premises known as a suite of
offices, located at Suite 401, at Plaintiff's office building (the
"Building"), located at 215 South State Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
7. In accordance with the terms of the Lease, Plaintiff
Parkside Salt Lake Corporation was the Landlord, and Insure-Rite ,
Inc., was the Tenant.

C:\WPDOCS\ins\parkside v insurerite lit.12.wpd
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8.

The Lease was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1998, unless

the Lease term was extended for a three year term, in accordance
with Exhibit "H", page H-l, attached to the complaint.
9. On or about February 6, 1998, Defendant Insure Rite, Inc.,
complying strictly with the provisions of the document known as the
"Renewal Option", exercised its Option to Extend the term of the
Lease.
10.

Within 30 days from the date of the exercise of Tenant's

Option to Extend, neither the undersigned nor anyone in Defendant's
behalf received the written notice set forth in line 12 of the
Renewal Option, which states that "Landlord must provide Tenant
with written notice of the new rental".
11.

Instead what was received from Landlord was Landlord's

February proposal.
12.

Affiant discussed with Perkins the February

[Lease]

proposal as made by Plaintiff and its authorized agents Wallace
Associates, and Collin Perkins, and expressly told Perkins that it
contained

numerous

misleading,

inaccurate information.

erroneous,

fraudulent,

and

In his discussions with Perkins affiant

told Perkins that the February proposal a) miscalculated the per
dollars square foot calculation of what would constitute "the then
prevailing market rates" for the Leased Premises; and b) Defendant
would not agree to waive and rescind Plaintiff's obligation under
the Lease to provide to Defendant free parking; and c) sought to
introduce annualized increases in the rents, in the absence of any
C:\WPDOCS\ms\parkside v m s u r e r i t e l i t . 1 2 . w p d
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such requirements under the Lease, a fact which was unacceptable to
Defendant; and d) provided for an increase in the amounts needed to
be paid by Defendant annually, on a per square foot basis, by not
taking into account the "Building" as set forth in the Lease; and
e) by falsifying other material information related to the Lease,
and presented all of the above to the Tenant.
13.

Prior to the date of the expiration of Defendant's right

to notify Plaintiff of its exercise of its Renewal Option, affiant
was

informed

that

a

major

tenant

in

Plaintiff's

Building

("Building") , to-wit: Access Long Distance ("Access") made a demand
upon the Landlord to obtain the premises now occupied by Defendant.
14. On or after march 16, 1998, and at many times thereafter,
Perkins and at times Ostlind informed affiant, that Perkins and the
Landlord would prefer to have Access occupy and use Defendant's
Leased Premises to the exclusion of Plaintiff, and would therefore
require Defendant to move and relocate.
15. After Perkins was notified

that the February Lease

proposal was not in accordance with the provisions of the Renewal
Option, Perkins on March 16, 1998, delivered to Defendant's counsel
Defendant's "Written Notice of the New Rental", the March proposal.
16. Affiant discussed with Perkins the March proposal, as made
by Plaintiff and its authorized agents Wallace Associates, and
Perkins, and expressly told Perkins, that it too contained numerous
misleading, erroneous, fraudulent, and inaccurate information.

C:\WPDOCS\ins\parkside v insurerite lit.12.wpd
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17.

Affiant in his discussions with Perkins and Ostlind, told

Perkins and Oslind that the March proposal calculated the Market
rate for the rents inaccurately by not using the provisions of the
Lease and the Renewal Option.
18.

Affiant was also told by Perkins that Landlord had

already leased Defendant's Leased Premises to Access.
19.

At all times relevant herein affiant

on numerous

occasions on behalf of Defendant told Perkins and Ostlind that
affiant exercised the Extension Term, affiant wished to remain in
the Leased Premises, and that Defendant would continue to pay the
monthly rent at $17.00 per sq/ft.
20.

After its exercise of its Option to Extend on February 6,

1998, and effective as of July 1, 1998, Defendant has made each and
every monthly payment required to be made by Defendant, under the
Lease and the Extension Term, in a sum equal to $17.00 per sq/ft,
for the premises that Defendant occupies.
DATED this

(O

day of November, 1998.

G. Richard Kasteler

C:\WPD0CS\ins\parkside v insurerite lit.12.wpd
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The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
10th day of November, 1998, the signojr hereof.

My Commission Expires:

flaw/I

'NOTARW/WBLIC, R e s i d i n g
S a l t iiake C o u n t y , U t a h

in

Notary Public
J
NICK J. CCLESSIDE3 1
468 South 400 East
i
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 ]
My Commission Excares *
Ft&naiy 23, 19$9
]

State of Utah

i

CERTIFICATE Of SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing, was served via:
facsimile
yl

hand delivery
United States mail, postage prepaid,

thIS

Jl+l

day of November 1998, to the following:

MR ROBERT L STOLEBARGER ESQ
MR GREGGORY J SAVAGE ESQ
MR MATTHEW N EVANS ESQ
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 1100
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
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EXHIBIT 5

NICK J. C O L E S S I D E S
ATTORNEY AT LAW
4 6 6 SOUTH 4 0 0 EAST. SUITE lOO
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8411 1-3325
TELEPHONE: 801 521-4441
FAX. 601 521-4452

March 5, 1998
Via fax: 801,359.0904
Hard copy via mail
Mr. Collin Perkins *
Office Services Group
Wallace Associates
165 South Main Street Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Insurite Lease
Suite 401
Parkside Towers

Dear Mr. Perkins,
This will re-confirm tenant's exercise of its option to renew
and extend the terms of the above referenced Lease for a term
of three years.
The "Market rate" should be at $ 17.00 per square foot.

H 0Pn 1

EXHIBIT 6

^^

tsEllis

Wallace Associates

Property Solutions Worldwide*

March 16, 1998

Mr. Nick Colessides
Attorney at Law
466 S. 400 E., Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RE:

WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE NEW RENTAL

Dear Mr. Colessides:
After a thorough review of Insure-Rite's Lease Agreement and in particular Exhibit *\HT
Renewal Option and considerable discussion with the Landlord and the Landlord's Counsel, the
following is the Landlord's Written Notice of the New Rental for the Premises containing
approximately 4,408 usable square feet or 5,037 rentable square feet, located on the 4th floor of
the building, suite 401, at 215 S. State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, floorplan enclosed. (See
Exhibit MA,r)
Landlord:

Parkside Salt Lake Corporation

Tenant:

Insure-Rite, Inc.

Lease Term:

3 years (as per Renewal Option)

Renewal Lease
Commencement:

July 1, 1998

Minimum Annual
Rent:
(see Exhibit "B")

Parking:
Operating Expense
Base Year:

Rental Rate/Sq.Ft.
S 17.50
SI 8.00
SI 8.50

Period
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3

Same as per Lease.

Same as per Lease.

noc 5

Confidential:

Tenant acknowledges that the terms and conditions
contained herein and details of the ensuing negotiations
will remain confidential between the parties to the lease
and no proposals, lease drafts, leases or summaries of any
kind will be distributed, copied, or otherwise transmitted,
orally or in writing to any other entity or person.

The terms proposed herein shall be valid through March 20,1998 by 5:00 pm MST.
It is understood that Collin Perkins of Grubb & Ellis|Wallace Associates represents the Landlord
and that Tenant has retained Nick J. Colessides, Attorney at Law, to represent them and the
principal parties agree thereto.
If the preceding offer is acceptable to you, please sign and return an acknowledged copy of this
Written Notice of the New Rental so we may begin drafting the Lease Amendment.
Should you have any questions regarding this proposal, please contact me at 579-3270.

Yours truly,

cc:

Gerald Goldman, American Realty Advisors
Richard Kastellar, Insure-Rite

ACCEPTED THIS

BY:_
FOR:
ITS:

DAY OF

1998.

i^xU.i- #'
ro

CJ

en

o^

CT

w

d

o

d
S

m

13

^
1ft

*
*

a

I

P
3

M

£L

FITZSIMMONS ASSOCIATES, INC.
ARCHITECTS

PLAiVNERS
—

— O

A

c/3 A\

EXHIBIT "B
COMPARABLE BUILDINGS AND LEASE COMPS

1. Parkside Tower-215 S. State

TENANT
SIZE
5,000 sf

RENTAL RATE
$17.00

WEIGHT
50%

(In addition to the beginning rental rate, an annual rent escalation of $.50 per square foot or 3% has
been achieved in 22 of the 24 leases consummated at Parkside Tower over the past 3 years. The only
exceptions have been one year term leases.)

2. City Center 1-175 East 400 SouthTenant: Property Research Group
5 years, March, 1997

7,000 sf

S19.50/sf

16.67%

3. 185 S. State
Tenant: Kinross Gold
3 years, July 1997

3,510 sf

$17.50/sf

16.67%

4. Broadway Center - 111 East Broadway
Tenant: Watkiss Dunning & Watkiss
5 years, November, 1997

7,134 sf

$17.00/sf

16.67%

S17.50/sf

100%

AVERAGE RENTAL RATE:

EXHIBIT 7

NICK J, COLESSIDES
ATTORNEY AT LAW
4 « e SOUTH +OQ EAST, SUITE : o o
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 3*111-3323
TELETHON'S: 801 Sgi-<K*<u
PAX. e^Ot 32l-<V43 2

March 25, 1998
Via fax: 801.359-0904
Hard copy via mail
Mr. Collin Perkins
Office Services Group
Wallace Associates
165 South Main Street Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Insurite Lease
Suite 401
Parkside Towers

Dear Mr* Perkins,
As I explained to you on the telephone the gentleman who will
be making the decision on the market rates was out of town and
unavailable* I also told you on the phone that we would be
responding in due course. I expected to be able to respond to
you sometime this week.
Nevertheless, as usual you are deciding unilaterally to
exercise independent judgment as it relates to the deadlines
set forth in the Lease (thus to ignore the 30 day notice
requirement), and you now are giving my client and me notice
on March 25, 1998, at about 2:00 o'clock p.m., that you have
decided that mv client's option is null and void until and
unless we succumb to your demand to respond by 5:00 o»clock on
th3 sap? <33Y that y<?\i gead your notice.
This sir la
unacceptableff in the future please consult your lawyer before
you take such precipitous action.
If your motive or intent is to make it so difficult for my
client to renew its Lease and to exercise its legal rights and
the option granted to Tenant by the Lease Agreement, as it is
set forth therein, i.e.: upon the same terms and conditions as
per the option granted in tha Lease, so that the net result
would be that you would be constructively evict my client, and
to otherwise interfere with my client's economic relations,
rest assured that it is my client's intent to seek redress in
a Court of competent jurisdiction.
Enough said.
C:\WPDOCS\I\inaurite lc*s?.2.wpd
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Mr. Collin Perkins
March 25, 1993
Page two

Now as to the response which you are demanding.
advised as follows:

Please be

There is NO question in anyone's mind and I hope not in yours
that the Tenant has validly exercised its rights pursuant to
Exhibit H, page H-l of the Lease.
Notwithstanding the fact that you are not following the Lease
provisions in terms of the required and necessary notices, my
reading of that page H-l gives the obligation to Landlord to
determine "Market Rates" as set forth therein; it does not
state that you on behalf of the Landlord can use the term
"prevailing market rates and condifrigngr insteqfl &£ J&a
required *Markefr Rates*. So that you know the terra "Market
Rate" does NOT include an annual increase for each of the
years number 2 and 3 of the exercised option to extend*
Whatever the "Market Rate" is at the time of the exercise of
the option to extend, the said rate shall apply for each of
the remaining years.
Please read section 28.4 cf the Lease, which appears, at least
to me, to say that you Mr. Perkins have NOT been elevated to
the rank of the ultimate arbiter in this matter.
Incidentally, I doubt it very seriously that a Court would
sustain your position that if my client takes issue with the
incorrect and erroneous methodology used by you in
ascertaining "market rates" that the option granted on page H-l
would become null and void. If you insist on litigating that
point please be my guest.
But again enough said on that subject as well.
Now as to the "Market Rates you are suggesting* You have
obviously calculated the_ Market Rate at $ 17.50 per square
foot using the wrong parameters.
The Market Rate to be
applied is the sum of $ 17,00 per square foot. Do not forget
that you have represented to me during our last meeting that

C:\wPD0CS\I\insiicit9 lease.2.upd
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Kr. Collin Perkins
March 25, 1998
Page three

while my client currently is paying at the rate of $ 16.15 per
square foot, that you believed that the current market rate
for the Building vas the sum of $ 17-00 per square foot, and
especially when you compared the rates with the Broadway
building rates. The same rate of $ 17.00 per square foot was
also contained in one of your proposals dated February 26,
1998, the said rate to be applied for the period of 7/1/98
through 6/30/99.
So there is no misunderstanding in anybody's mind and
especially yours, this is to re-iterate that Tenant has
exercised its option to extend, and that effective as of July
1, 1998, and continuously monthly thereafter Tenant shall pay
as and for basic rents the sum of $ 17,00 per square foot for
the following 3 6 months, and all other terms, provisions, and
conditions of the Lease shall be and remain in full force and
effect*
The matter now is laid to rest. Incidentally, my client does
NOT have to sign the insulting and confrontational language
contained in your various iterations of the "lease offer*, and
therefore, you should not expect a response other than what I
am providing you herein.
Your "Rambo* style of negotiating the extension of the above
referenced Lease has been exhaustive of any good will I may
have had for you or the Landlord, Your insolent manner in
handling this transaction is very difficult to tolerate. You
have managed to alienate your Tenant.
PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY.

cc: Insurite, Inc.

C:\WPOCCS\I\insurite lease.2.wpd

EXHIBIT 8

Holme Roberts & Owen LLP

April 27, 1998

I1

VIA TELEFAX AND U.S. MAIL
Nick J. Colessides, Esq.
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
Re:

Parkside Salt Lake Corporation—Renewal Option Under Insure-Rite Lease

Dear Mr. Colessides:
I have received and reviewed your letter to me dated April 20,1998, and
am writing to respond to it.
David //. Little
hltlcd@hro com

ittorneys at Law
til East Broadway
Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah

Ulll-5233

In your letter, you assert that your client has not rescinded its election to
extend the term of the lease, yet you continue to take issue with the rental rate
Parkside has established. Under the terms of the lease, your client must accept the
market rental rate established by the landlord or rescind its election to extend the
lease term. Your client cannot have it both ways by asserting that its election to
extend remains in effect while rejecting the market rental rate established by the
landlord. Inasmuch as your client has rejected, and repeatedly affirmed its
rejection of, the market rental rate established by Parkside, Parkside regards your
client as having rescinded its election to extend the lease term.

Vel (801)521-5800
'ax (801) 521-9639
uww.hro.com
)alt Lake City
Denver
Moulder
Colorado Springs
jondon
Jos cow

I fail to see how your client's position is supported by your characterization
of the $18.00 rate referenced in my prior letter as a "new" rental rate or your
complaint regarding the "arbitrary" deadline my letter established for your client's
acceptance of the rate. Under the terms of the lease, your client had thirty days to
react to the rental rate established by the landlord, which your client did by
rejecting the rate that was so established. The thirty-day period had expired long
before the date of my letter. My letter merely extended to your client, as a
courtesy, an additional period in which to accept the extension of its lease term at
an $18.00 rate. It does not strike me as inappropriate for Parkside to set the
deadline for your client's acceptance of this courtesy or to establish the terms upon
which the courtesy is offered. Please note that the $18.00 rate reflects an effort to
respond to your prior objection to an escalating rate. This rate is the average of
the rates of $17.50, $18.00 and $18.50 for the first, second and third years,
respectively, of the extended lease term set forth in Parkside's prior notices.

#54420
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Holme Roberts & Owen LLP

Nick J. Colessides, Esq.
April 27, 1998
Page 2
Your reference to the February 26, 1998 letter from Mr. Perkins to attack
the $18.00 rate was disingenuous. If you were to calculate the effective rate of that
proposal, you would find that it is $18.33. Moreover, that letter was in response to
a request from your client for a proposal for a ten-year lease of different space in
the building. These differences and others, such as the fact that the ten-year
proposal did not include free parking, make that proposal irrelevant to the matter at
hand.
Your assertion that the five parking spaces provided for under the current
lease should not be taken into account is not supportable. A market rental rate
cannot be determined in a vacuum. It is substantially influenced by the specific
terms of the lease. The level of services provided by the landlord, the desirability
of the space, the length of the lease term, the credit worthiness of the tenant and
many other factors affect the rental rate at which a landlord is willing to lease
space to a tenant. By suggesting that the parking provisions of the lease should be
ignored, are you also suggesting that Parkside is free to ignore other provisions of
the lease that may, if ignored, allow Parkside to justify a rate of $19.00, $20.00 or
higher?
If your client fails to vacate the premises by June 30, 1998, which is the
end of the lease term, Parkside will immediately commence summary eviction
proceedings against your client. In connection with such proceedings, Parkside
will seek treble damages, as it is entitled to do under the Utah forcible entry and
detainer statute. Additionally, Parkside reserves the right to pursue any other
rights and remedies that it may have.
truly yours,

I^MWL
DHL:dd
cc:
Gerald Goldman

#54420
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July 9, 1998

D21085

THREE DAY NOTICE TO QUIT
Jnsurg-Rite. Inc.
215 S. State Street, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that your lease has expired and you must
surrender the premises located at 215 S. State Street, Suite 450, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(the "Premises") within three (3) days. The Premises are owned by Parkside Salt Lake
Corporation (the "Owner").
WITHIN THREE DAYS after service of this notice upon you, you must vacate
the Premises and surrender possession of the Premises with keys to the Owner, or his duly
authorized a^ent.
-4-^V.

You are not relieved of liability for any amount currently due by vacating the
premises. If you fail to vacate the Premises within the three day period, you will be
unlawfully detaining possession of the Premises. In accordance with the provisions of
Sections 78-36-1 si s£q., Utah Code Ann., the Owner will commence an action against you
to evict you from the Premises and you will be liable to the Owner for the rent accrued, plus
three times the damages arising out of your unlawful detention of the Premises and any
damages to the Premises, plus court costs, attorneys' fees and any other amounts allowed by
law.

Robert L. Stolebarger
Holme Roberts & O w e n ^ p
Attorneys for Parkside Salt Lake Corporation

#57290
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be hand-delivered a copy of the
foregoing THREE DAY NOTICE TO VACATE this 9th day of July, 1998, to the following:
Insure-Rite, Inc.
215 S. State Street, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

wyjju^^

#57290

EXHIBIT 10

1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

-oOo-

4

PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP., a )
Utah corporation,
)

5

Plaintiff,

)

Case No. 980906982

)

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Videotape Proceedings)

6

vs.
7
8

INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah
corporation,

)
)

9

Defendant.

)

INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah
corporation,

)
)

10
11

Third-Party
Plaintiff,

12

)
)

13

vs.

)

14
15

COLLIN PERKINS, an
individual, and
WALLACE & ASSOCIATES,

)
)
)

1G

Third-Party
Defendants.

1?

)
)
-oOo-

18
19
20

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 1st day of March,

21

1999, commencing at the hour of 10:04 a.m., the above-

22

entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE

23

STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, sitting as Judge in the above-named

24

Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the

25

following videotape proceedings were had.

ALAN P ilVHTH, CSR

mw

385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107

*

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff:

MATTHEW N. EVANS
Attorney at Law
Holme, Roberts & Owen
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

For the Defendant:

JOHN GIONOPOLUS
Attorney at Law

* * *

2

the conclusion of this matter and with that, we believe
similarly, it would be wise to have all damages determined
at the conclusion of all matters in this case.

That is

our first point.
Our second point, Judge, is, last week, and I
believe it was Thursday or Friday of last week, InsureRite received the following in the mail from Parkside.
If I may approach?
THE COURT:

Certainly.

I assume Mr. Evans has a copy?
MR. GIONOPOLUS:

I—I've got one right here for

him.
And what it is, Judge, is, it's an invoice for
rent due to Parkside during the hold-over tenancy and the
calculation of rent due is pursuant to the hold-over
clause in the lease, which is Section 22 of the lease, and
I've included a copy of that, Judge.
We believe that the proper calculation of
damages during the hold-over tenancy is in fact the
calculations that Parkside submitted to Insure-Rite last
week, which is under the hold-over provision if the lease
and not under the treble damages provision of Utah's
unlawful detainer statute.
The treble damages provision, Judge, presupposes that the landlord and tenant have made no

9

2855 E Cottonwood Partway, Ste 560
Salt Lake City. Utah 84121
(801)365 6200

[Statement

DATE

DESCRIPTION

7/01/98
7/01/98
7/01/98

HOIOOVER RENT
ESCALATION
AFTER MRS 5/15-6/15

215-450-CU
IMSURE-RITE, IMC.
215 SO. STATE ST., #450
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
AMOUNTDUE
13,557.92
722.00
47.40

BALANCE

_£**

Total Current Charges

14,327.32

nents received after the LWIh of the month
Co» m «t

•R&'StK^^

$ 14,327.32
SALT LAKE CORPORATION

INSURE-RITE INC
ATTN: RICHARD KASTELER
215 S STATE, STE. 450
SALT LAKE COT, UT 84111

Statement Date:
Total Due:

Keep this portion for your records

7/01/98

$ 14,32732

Mr. Stewart—Mr. Kenneth Stewart's affidavit.

That's what

we're seeking here is damages under Mr. Stewart's
affidavit.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Evans.

I'm going to grant the motion for summary
judgment.

I think the Kesteller and the Stewart

affidavits establish a value of not less than $17 and—and
I acknowledge at the same time that the plaintiff is not
conceding that the market value is only $17, but for
purposes of the motions, I understood that there was a
proposal that that would be acceptable under the
circumstances.
I will also award a reasonable attorney's foe
and expect an attorney fee affidavit that conforms with
the Code of Judicial Administration that will go to Mr.
Cionopolus and then to me, with any objection to the
affidavit.
And Mr. Evans, you'll prepare an order.
MR. EVANS:

Yes, I will, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GIONOPOLUS:

Thank you, Judge.

If I may, could I—we would like to ask that you
would certify the summary judgment ruling as final under
Rule 54. As you know, w e —

15

TRANSCRIBERS CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.
)

I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify:
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith,
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I
received an electronically recorded videotape of the
within matter and under his supervision have transcribed
the same into typewriting, and the foregoing pages,
numbered from 1 to 17, inclusive, to the best of my
ability constitute a full, true and correct transcription,
except where it is indicated the Videotape Recorded Court
Proceedings were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 15th day of
July, 2000.

Transcriber
Subscribed and sworn to before me this J--'u
of J u l y ,

2000.

(5QPY
Notary Public
( S E A L )
NOTARY PUBLIC
ALAM P. SMITH
385 BRAHMA DRIVE
MURRAY, UT 84107
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC. 4, 2001
STATE OF UTAH

18

day

REPORTERS CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss.

I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically
recorded videotape of the within matter and caused the
same to be transcribed into typewriting, and that the
foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 17, inclusive, to the
best of my knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible,
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 18th day of
July, 2000.

EXHIBIT 11
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Address

HOLiME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
Robert L Stolebarger, #3123
Greggory J Savage, #5988
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone- (801)521-5800
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORPORATION, )
a Utah corporation,
)

SUMMONS

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 980906982
v.

Judge Stephen L. Henriod
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO INSURE-RITE, INC..
You are hereby summoned and required to File an Answer in writing to the Complaint,
which has been Filed with the Court and is herewith served upon you, with the Clerk ofthe aboveentitled Court at 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City. Utah 84114 and to serve upon or mail to
Plaintiffs attorney. Holme Roberts & Owen \ i ,\ 111 East Bioadway. Suite 1 100, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, a copy of said Answer within seven (") days after service of said Complaint upon you.

If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in said Complaint.
DATED this r ^ H a y of July, 1998.
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLF

Please Serve Defendant At:
G. Richard Kasteler
President/Registered Agent
Insure-Rite, Inc.
215 S. State Street, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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STATE CF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

3

-cOo-

4
5

PARKSIDE SALT LAKE
CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,

6

Plaintiff,

Case No. 98 090 6982
Judae Stephen L. Henriod
7
8

vs .
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah
corporation,

HEARING

9
Defendant.
10
-oOo11
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 26th day of October,
12
1998, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before
13
the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, sitting as Judge m

the

14
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that
15
the following proceedings were had.
16
-oOo17

19
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1 II

MR. EVANS:

Your Honor, in addition, we've also

2

provided Mr. Colessides with a notice of this hearing.

3

is--he is aware of that, he's here.

4

THE COURT:

Ke

Well, and he's filed an objection to

5 I it, so I can't see hew you could have filed an objection to
6 II the motion for summary judgment: if you're not ready :o
7

respond to it.

8
9

MR. COLESSIDES:

Well, Your Honor, I--I did--I

filed my objection on the basis of jurisdiction, Your Honor,

10

and I am not here to respond in terms of the merits, Your

11

Honor.

12

Honor.

13

It does put us in a rather untenable situation, Your

THE COURT:

I think we can reschedule this in just

14

a few days.

15

having an opportunity to respond.

16

I don't want to cut your client off without

MR. COLESSIDES:

I appreciate--well, Your Honor,

17

if--if the Court--Your Honor, if the Court rules that as a

18

matter of law that the proper--the service is proper--

19

THE COURT:

That's already been done.

20

MR. COLESSIDES:

Well, I- -that's--that's what I--I

21

was going to suggest to the Court, is then I will be able to

22

file, Your Honor, what I need to file in connection with

23

this matter.

24

25

1

THE COURT:

Okay.

01045

17
MR. COLESSIDES:

And then they can file, I

suppose, anotner motion for summary judgment, if they think
they have
4 ||

one.
THE COURT:

5 || file another one.

Well, I don't they're gonna need to
I think we can rely on the one they've

6 II filed.
MR. COLESSIDES:
THE COURT:

Okay.

And I'm going to set this for a

9 || hearing a: 9:15 on Friday, November the 6th.

And I'm sorry

10

to have wasted anybody's time, but I think Mr. Colessides

11

has raised enough issues to warrant giving him the extra

12

time to respond.

13

So, on the motion for summary judgment, any

14

objections to, any motions to strike, that will all be heard

15

9:15, November the 6th, that's a Friday morning.

16

MR. COLESSIDES:

Okay.

Your Honor, in view of the

17

fact that the Court already ruled that the summons has been

18

properly served and is no longer quashed.

19

THE COURT:

Yes.

20

MR. COLESSIDES:

21

to file my answer and counterclaim.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. COLESSIDES:

24

THE COURT:

25

Then I--obviously, I'm entitled

Yes, you are.
I presume that the Court--

Yes, but that--that doesn't cut off

the time for the summary judgment.

0 1 0 IP

MR. COLESSIDES:
THE COURT:

Good.

MR. COLESSIDES:
THE COURT:

Well, okay.

Okay.

Yes.

MR. COLESSIDES:

That's fine.

But I'm just saying

to the Court, Your Honor, maybe the Court, there may not be
adequate time for them to respond, Your Honor, because if I
were to file-THS COURT:

To your counterclaim.

10

MR. COLESSIDES:

11

THE COURT:

I'm sorry?

Correct.

And if you file a legitimate

12

counterclaim, then that will survive this hearing because

13

this hearing isn't directed toward any counterclaim.

14

just directed to the complaint that the Plaintiff has filed.

15

MR. COLESSIDES:

I will--okay.

It's

I will be filing

16

two things, Your Honor.

17

objecting to the—to their motion for summary judgment.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. COLESSIDES:

Obviously, I will--obviously

Yes.
And file any other motions that I

20

may have, Your Honor, as well.

21

THE COURT:

Well, we'll want to make sure

22

everybody has adequate time to respond to any motions, but

23

we're setting this hearing for Plaintiff's motion for

24

summary judgment, Defendant's objection, Defendant's motion

25

11

01047

19
to strike the affidavit, and any other appropriately

related

2 ]| subject matter.
3 ||

MR. COLESSIDES:

Your Honor, there is a n o t h e r

4 II deficiency in this proceeding, and we tend to raise that by
5

motion, as w e l l .

We believe, Your Honor, that the notice

6

that has been provided, the three-day notice that has been

7

provided is insufficient under the statute.

8

fully recognizes, the unlawful detainer action is strictly--

9

it's an acuion which the statute must be strictly construed.

As the Court

10 M ^ n e notice which has been given to my client, Your Honor, is
11

not pursuant to the statute.

12

we'll be doing by motion, as well.

13
14

THE COURT:

That is one other thing that

Okay, and we can hear that on the 6th,

as well.

15

MR. COLESSIDES:

16

THE COURT:

Fine.

Thank you, Your Honor."

Here's your docket, Mr. C o l e s s i d e s .
Let me suggest, on the record

17

Mr. Evans, y o u r documents.

18

now, that based en what I've heard, parties ought to start

19

considering mitigation of damages right away--

20

MR. COLESSIDES:

21

THE COURT:

22

--and consider a resolution short of a

Court Order.

23

MR. COLESSIDES:

24

THE COURT:

25

Yes.

Okay.

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you.
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IS THE, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR

1 option, he can reject the rental rate for a period of
2 30 days following notice from the landlord at which
3 time tenant exercises its option to extend shall be
4 null and void. He had two options, he could either
5 accept the market rate w e gave him or he could go
6 find new lease space. That w a s the option.
7
N o w , case law is very clear., and I have
8 already cited it in the previous hearing, Your Honor,
9 that you have to comply strictly with the terms of an
10 option agreement.
11
THE COURT: I see.
12
MR. EVANS: Your Honor, what the
13 Defendants Insure-Rite are trying to do is they are
14 trying to rewrite the lease. They are trying to say,
15 " W e have an option. We have the right to set the
16 market rate."
17
THE COURT: Right. They are not trying
18 to rewrite it. They are trying to say that the
19 market rate, the definition there just below the
20 mid-point of that paragraph, is something that can be
21 calculated specifically. A n d they calculate it at
22 S I 7 , and S I 8 was the amount. I mean, there are very
23 few issues of fact here, obviously. They sent their
24 fax that said they wanted to exercise the option.
25 The landlord got back to them, said S I 8 will be the

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF 'JTAH

4
5

PARKS IDE SALT LAKE CCRP ,
a ..tan corporation,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 9809Co^92

•

INSJRE-3ITE, INC , a Utah
corporation,

HEARING, 11-12-99

Dersr.danc.

3E IT REMEMBERED that en the 13th day
it
are

Nov-poer, 1999, at 1:00 o'clock p.n., this cause
on for rearing oefore the HONORABLE STEPHEN L.

I E N R I C D , District Court, without a jury, in tne Salt
Laxe County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah.

S A R A N C S S :

13

For the Plaintiff:

MATTHEW N. EVANS
Attorney at Law

For the Defendant:

NICK J COLESSIDES
Attorney at Law

19
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|21
22
Co-rt Transcriber'
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PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: Okay, Counsel, are we ready
on the matter of Parkside versus Insure-Rite?
MR. EVANS: Yes, I am. Your Honor. Matt
Evans on behalf of the Parkside, a Salt Lake
corporation.
THE COURT: Mr. Colessides, are you
8 ready?
MR. COLESSIDES: Yes, Your Honor. I ask
9
110 for the Clerk. Your Honor, to give us a tape of the
.1 proceedings. THE COURT: That's fine.
112
I have read all of the submissions,
|13
14 Counsel. I've read them carefully. It appears to me
Il5 this case, this motion, revolves around whether or
not an S18 market rate is a term that the Defendants
had a right to dispute, negotiate or not.
So, please go ahead, Mr. Evans.
18
MR. EVANS Your Honor, along those
[19
lines,
I'll
address that direct issue, and we'll deal
120
121 with that separate forward. The option agreement
22 which I've set forth over here states that - as you
23 had mentioned, that the landlord, Parkside, would set
24 the market rate. At that point, the tenant under the
strict terms of the lease, plain and simple under the

I

13

14
15
16
17
;is
|19

bo
21
22
23
24
2^

Page 3
market rate. They said, "We don't like S I 8 , " and the
30 days expired; correct?
MR. EVANS. Correct.
THE COURT. Okay. Well, that's where I
see it, so if that is where you would like to point
your argument, I'd appreciate it.
MR. EVANS: That's where we would. Your
Honor, j u s t to point out, even if w e gave them the
rate which they are saying they are claiming, they
could say, "Well, no, the market rate is not that.
It's something else." The landlord has the right to
set the market rate. Their remedy is to either and I've already indicated this. Their remedy is
either to accept it or go find new lease space.
Thank you. Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, tell m e before you step
down, in that case, what does the language comparable
size, similar terms, similar credit worthy tenant,
first by reference to the building, second to the
other similar buildings in Downtown Salt Lake, what
does that suppose to mean if you can't use it to sec
whether or not the market rate is fair?
MR. EVANS. Your Honor, I suppose there
is a good-faith - something, a good-faith covenant
written in there, that w e ' d make a good-faith effort

PAJKJK^IDt!. V
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1 to do that Lnder the lease we did that We made
2 the good-faith effort We took our building, we took
3 three other buildings and we said, "Here it is This
4 is what we have the right to do under the lease You
5 can't tell us what the rental rate is " I suppose
6 Mr Colessides could come in here and say, "Listen,
7 the rental rate is two bucks, and so therefore we'd
8 exercise their option "
9
THE COLRT It your client had written
10 back and said the market rate is S30 a foot, would
1 i that still have, in these other conditions being the
12 same, resulted m the option being void at the end of
13 the 30 days 9
14
MR EVAMS I think under the express 15 under the express terms, they have a right to reject
16 it or go find other lease space If they wanted to
17 out negotiate something saying that they could come
18 m and that they could, you know, fight with the
19 landlord 20
THE COURT No matter what the number is
21 that the landlord chooses for market rate
22
MR EVAiNS Your Honor, I think there is
23 probably a good faith argument written - or a
24 covenant written in there We have to deal in good
25 faith And I think the facts, the undisputed facts

4

Page 6
1 as follows, Your Honor If the February 11th
2 proposal is supposed to be that notice that is
3 defective for the seven reasons that we mentioned in
4 our memorandum, Your Honor First of all, in our
5 leased space, that particular February 11th proposal,
6 Your Honor, does not include fust and foremost the
7 the building m question If you notice in our- it
8 is Exhibit 2, Your Honor I'm sorry. Exhibit 3 m
9 their letter
10
THE COURT Letter hand-delivered ~
11 dated February 10 and delivered and received on
12 February (Inaudible) ~
13
MR COLESSIDES August 11 That is
14 correct (Inaudible)
15
THE COURT (Inaudible)
16
MR COLESSIDES As you review that, Your
17 Honor, the last page is an attached exhibit which
18 contains the comparable buildings and lease comps
19
THE COURT I don't see anywhere in the
20 lease where it says they have to tell you what
21 buildings they are using
j 22
MR COLESSIDES Yes, Your Honor, you do
| 23
THE COURT Where9
I 24
MR COLESSIDES I apologize, Your
25 Honor Your Honor, right here it says -- may I

Page 5
Page 7
9
7
i are, that we did make a good-faith effort We took
1 approach May I come close
2 three buildings, we took our own building and we made 2
THE COURT No, right there
3 that good-faith effort So, yeah, there is a
3
MR COLESSrDES Your Honor, you'll
4 good-faith effort - a good-faith covenant written in
4 notice on Line 13, Your Honor the definition of
5 there And we complied with that There is no - 1
:> marketplace is stated as follows It ^ays
6 don't think you can dispute that we didn't comply
0
"Market rate as used by landlord
7 with that Obviously, even their rate that they are
7
to determine the new basic rent shall
8 setting is close to our rate There is no doubt that
8
be the rental rate for comparable
9 we didn't go out there and try to, in bad faith, try
9
space of comparable size for a similar
10 to kick them out of these premises If they'd
10
term for a similar credit worthy
11 accepted this rate, which is right around where their
11
tenant by reference first to the
?
2 rate is, they would be m the premises There would
12
building and second to the other
13 be no dispute So we did follow that I would say
113
similar buildings in Downtown Salt
14 that there is a good faith clause m there implied in
14
Lake City"
15 all contracts And we did comply with that
15
THE COURT That's all you are relying
9
16
THE COLRT Okay Thank you, Mr Evans
! 16 on That does not say that they have to tell your
17
Mr Colessides
, 17 client what buildings they are using when they are
18
MR COLESSIDES Your Honor, it is
18 coming up with the market rate
i 19 important to note m our case that once we
19
MR COLESSIDES That is true But they
I
20 exercised the option to extend, it was the landlord's
20 do have to rely upon the building, though, that
-1 responsibility to provide us with a written notice of
121 building which is the building that we are on And
22 the new rental
22 if you notice in their Exhibit, Your Honor, Exhibit \
23
THE COLRT Thev did
23 which is attached to the February proposal, it does
-4
MR COLF SSIDFS We respectfully submit,
24 not have anything as to square foot on that building
-* Your Honor, if the Court would take issue with that
25 of their own

r
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We have submitted various other grounds,
Your Honor -- let me backtrack one more time, Your
» J Honor, and ask the Court to consider the following
4 language. The following language is on the -5 appears on the fifth line of the renewal option. In
6 there it says:
7
"That the option to extend the
term of this lease (that's on the
8
fourth line) for an additional period
9
of three years (which is called the
10
extension of terms) upon the same
ill
terms and conditions as to ~ except
12
as to basic rents which shall be
113
adjusted
to the then prevailing market
[14
rate."
15
And it is extremely important, Your
|16
Honor,
to differentiate between what prevailing
17
118 market rate is vis-a-vis what Plaintiff wants to have
I 1 9 the effective rate, and that's extremely important,
120 Your Honor. Because their rate as stated both in the
|21 February exhibit, Your Honor, the February proposal,
! 22 which is a proposal and not in compliance with this
renewal option. It's merely for a new proposal.
24
As a matter of fact, I would like for a
moment to compare the two exhibits, Your Honor.

HliAKJNG, 11-13-98

Page 10
1 detainer action based on a right of a tenant who has
2 exercised its option to renew. That's why it is so
3 important, Your Honor, that once -- that that option
4 to renew must be exercised as the Court so
5 appropriately said in particularly where both
6 optionor, the Plaintiff, and optionee, the Defendant,
7 must, in fact, strictly comply with the requirements
8 of this Exhibit A, the renewal option, Your Honor.
9
I respectfully submit to the Court, Your
10 Honor, that the February 11th proposal was not any
11 more than a proposal for a new lease. It was not a
12 written notice of renewal rental. What it sought to
13 do, Your Honor, it sought to take away the parking
14 space. He said it himself on the second page, and
15 I'm talking about the February 2nd proposal, Your
16 Honor. It says in itself:
17
"This list proposal is a
18
solicitation for an offer. It does
19
not constitute and shall not be deemed
20
an offer."
21
We are not talking about an offer and
22 acceptance, Your Honor. All we are saying is we, the
23 optionee, who have a right to extend - to exercise
24 our option when, in fact, exercise our option on
25 February the 6th. After that it is their duty to

Page 9
Page i:
There was another notice given in March 16th, 1998.
comply strictly with the terms of that option
2 agreement, Your Honor, and to give us, in fact - to
l - That one. Your Honor, specifically states exactly
what it is supposed to be. (Inaudible) Your Honor
3 give us a written notice of the new rental. They did
4 not do that. And they only have 30 days to do so,
is, in fact, a written notice of the new rental,
!
complying
exactly
with
the
language,
Your
Honor,
that
5 Your Honor.
I 5
says right here:
Subsequent to that and after they gave us
6
7 that notice and we said, "We don't agree with it,"
"Landlord must provide the
tenant with written notice of the new
8 they came back with what they say is a written
9 proposal this time, a written notice of the rent.
rental."
10 And that is 11 days late. Your Honor, because they
That's exactly what they did. They did
11 only have 30 days. And the additional fact about
that on the 16th, Your Honor. And that is - on the
12 that March 16th notice, Your Honor, is their leasing
16th. That exhibit, Your Honor, specifically - if
1} agent, Mr. Perkins, said, "You only have four days to
you
will
look
on
the
last
on
an
exhibit
attached
1u
1 4 to that particular notice, it has the Parkside Tower
14 accept that," while the lease renewal option says
I
;15 rental, Your Honor, at S17 a square foot.
15 specifically, and I quote from it:
"Tenant may reject the new rental
16
jlfi
Their own exhibit on the notice of March
,?
rate
for a period of 40 days following
17
16th
which
takes
into
account
the
S17
rate
and
sets
i
notice from the landlord in which the
IS
forth that the building, if one would look at the
tenant
— at which time tenants
renewal option again, which is an integral part of
19
exercise of its option to extend shall
this lease, sets forth that the rent they want to
20
be null and void."
21
! - ' charge us is SI7. That's what it says up here. And
1-70 that's what we are supposed to (Inaudible). And
They didn't even give us 30 days. They
22
said,
"You
have got four days to get in and get out."
that's what we have been paying.
23
!24
24 You see, we are saying to the Court, Your Honor, that
This issue, Your Honor, is not about an
this renewal option is what we rely upon. They must
unlawful detainer action. This is about an unlawful
l

h
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Page 12
l do exactly as we are required to do
I 2
And m terms of the what the proper
| 3 amount of rent is, Your Honor, the two things that
4 are on file that have not been controverted, one is
5 the affidavit by Mr Catseller (phonetic) which bays
6 that if they properly exercise the option to extend
7 That is part of our submissions, Your Honor I don't
S know if the Court has our submissions, Your Honor
9
THE COURT I do
10
MR COLESSIDES And then the second
11 affidavit is by an expert, Your Honor, in the real
12 estate industry
i 13
THE COURT I have read it
14
MR COLESSIDES Okay Thank you In
15 any event, those two facts, Your Honor, (Inaudible)
16 affidavits are uncontroverted before this Court
17 Therefore, on that basis alone, the motion for
18 summary judgment must be denied, Your Honor
19
I will submit it unless the Court has
20 some other questions of me, Your Honor
21
THE COURT Thank you, Mr Colessides
22
MR COLESSIDES Thank you
23
THE COURT Mr Evans, I think the
124 Defense raises an interesting point In your
i25 client's letter dated February 10 on Page 2, which is

Page 14 I
1 different ~ trouble dealing with that issue But
2 that's not the issue The issue is, did we give them
3 a new rental rate and did they accept it They
4 didn't
5
Your Honor, we — I really think we are
6 splitting hairs here about the option agreement We
7 gave them a notice of it within the right time, and
8 they - they said, "We are not going to accept it
9 We reject it "
10
Your Honor, with regard to the
11 affidavits, they were filed two days ago I haven't
12 had a chance to respond to the affidavits
13
Before I sit down, are there any other
14 questions that you have 9
15
THE COURT No
16
MR EVANS Okay
17
THE COURT Don't worry about the
18 affidavits
19
MR EVANS Okay Your Honor, what we
20 are trying to do here is simply enforce the strict
21 terms of an option agreement We are saying to the
22 other side, "Listen, we made a good-faith effort to
23 put before you what m good faith is the market
24 rate It is supported by different buildings If
125 you accept it, you get your three-year option."

Page 13
Page 15
i what your client purports to be the notification of
1
There is nowhere in the lease where they
' 2 market rate, when it says, "This lease proposal is a
| 2 are entitled to come in and say, "No, we think the
I 3 solicitation for an offer and does not constitute and
3 market rate is this ' The landlord sets it They
I 4 shall not be deemed an offer " Do you have a
4 tan either accept it or they can find a new lease
5 response to that>
5 space There is plenty ot new lease space They
| 6
MR FV \NS Yes, Your Honor The
6 didn't do either Once their term expired — we
| 7 didn't kick them out Once fheir term expired on
7 provision says that we will propose a new rental rate
I S there It doesn't say — I suppose if we had as
8 June 30th we then filed this unlawtul detainer
i 9 we did, proposed a rental rate, and Insure-Rite said,
9 claim
! 10 "I accept the rental rate," and then we came in here
10
THE COLRT rhank you, Mr Evans
! l i and said, "Hey you know, it is not binding," then it
11
I'm granting the motion lor partial
112 would be a valid argument The point is that we
12 summary judgment The reason is this phrase,
113 proposed a rental rate in the letter They, instead
1 ^ sentence, which I think is the key to the whole case
1
14 — instead of sa>mg, "Listen, you know, is this an
14 and the renewal ot an option, which is 'Market rate
| is offer of acceptance,' they said, "We reject it It
115 as used by landlord to determine the new basic rent
116 is P bucks"
16 shall be the rental rate " The reason this is not a
n
,'
We had given them notice If you look at
17 formula wnich can result in an exact calculation no
Is* the terms, we need to give them notice of the rental
18 matter what an appraiser says or anybody else - had
, 19 rate That's what we did We gave them notice of
19 it specifically identified buildings specific
2v) the new rental rate Lnder the strict terms of the
20 buildings, specific floors specific conf gurations
j
21 option agreement once we gave them the notice, all
21 or minimum and maximum square footage mayre we could
122 they had to do was accept it, boom, option is
22 get there But my ruling is what this does is about
»23 renewed, we wouldn't have this problem
23 what Mr Evan said it does that is it requires
j--*
I suppose if that different issue is
24 fairness Somebody couldn't -- die landlord couldn't
2s before the Court, we would - we would have a
2> have said 30 bucks, the same way the tenant Louldn't
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because you filed an objection. I'm denying the
objection. Your client received the proper summons.
That is my ruling on that. That was my ruling
4 before.
5
MR. COLESSIDES: Did the Court sign the
i 6 order?
THE COURT: I have not yet signed the
8 order. In fact, I — I'm not really happy with the
i 9 order. There were some -- there was some language I
| , 0 think I didn't agree with. The bond may be moot at
i 11 this point.
Has a new bond been filed0
112
MR. COLESSIDES: No, Your Honor.
113
!l4
THE COURT: That bond is deficient. That
i, J 13 was my ruling then. Although, Mr. Evans, I did rule
l t d that $25,000 was the appropriate amount until further
I
' \1 court order.
lis
MR. COLESSIDES: May we have a right to
I
Q substitute, Your Honor, the order -- the (Inaudible),
M
.20 Your Honor, in a cash bond (Inaudible).
:i
THE COURT: Oh, you can, but you are
still going to have to vacate the premises based on
the ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
;
24
MR. COLESSIDES. I understand that, Your
j
I
Honor. 1 understand that.
;

h
i

L

t
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have come back with two bucks. It says there's got
1
MR. EVANS: I want to make sure that in
to be a fair market price. We are talking about a
2 the first order that it is until further ruling of
range. There is no question in my mind but SI8 falls
3 the Court, so that it isn't an issue that we can't
within the fair range that we are talking about.
4 (Inaudible) in the future (Inaudible).
That being the case, it doesn't matter whether the
5
THE COURT: No, you can't February 10 letter or the March 16th letter is the
6
MR. EVANS: (Inaudible).
notification to the Defendant of the new rate. They
7
THE COURT: It could be raised in the
both say S18 a foot, the first one somewhat
8 future. But as I said at that time, I believe, Judge
ambiguous, the the second one is not ambiguous at
9 Lewis set $25,000 as the amount of the possession
all. In neither event did the tenant respond
10 bond. The Defendant had the amount based on her
accepting the SI8 rate. 30 days after notice, that
11 order, and that is the amount. And that is the same
option is gone.
12 amount for them to file unless we have another motion
So there is no lease, the option was not
13 and a hearing and there is a change in that amount
properly exercised and the tenant has to vacate the
14 that's based on argument.
premises.
15
MR. EVANS: Hopefully that issue will be
That's the ruling. Thank you, Counsel.
16 rendered moot by your decision today.
MR. EVANS: Your Honor, would you like me
17
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, in
to prepare an order of the decision?
18 connection with your decision today, is there any
THE COURT: Of course.
19 particular time that the Court is granting my client
MR. EVANS: Thank you.
20 to remove himself from these premises?
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, there is
21
THE COURT: Forthwith.
another matter before the Court. It is the order of
22
MR. COLESSIDES: I am sorry?
the prior ruling upon which - we don't know. I
23
THE COURT: Forthwith. No grace period.
checked with the court files, and it was not signed.
24 I have signed the initial order now.
THE COURT: I haven't signed it yet
25
Do you want the courtesy copies back,
Page 19
Mr. Colessides?
MR. COLESSIDES: Please. Thank you.
THE COURT: And I appreciate them. I
like it when the entire package is there. 1 read
both sides. It was well put together.
MR. COLESSIDES: We always try to be
fair. Your Honor. Thank you. May we ask the Court,
Your Honor, for a copy of that order that was just
signed today?
THE COURT: I assume that a copy has been
sent to you. You can have a copy of a signed order,
of course.
MR. COLESSIDES: Yes (Inaudible).
THE COURT: For your appeal?
MR. COLESSIDES: (Inaudible) appeal, Your
Honor, yes. Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay.
Anything else, Mr. Evans?
MR. EVANS: One minor - well, it is not
a minor issue. I will plan on preparing an order
today, obviously, on the unlawful detainer. I'm
pretty certain that Mr. Colessides will object to
that as in the other order. I would like it, if
possible, some time that I can come with - after the
period of objection to get a signed order from you so

f

~
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1 we can execute on it.
2
THE COURT: Just follow the rule and you
3 won't have any trouble. Mr. Colessides needs the
4 time provided in the rule to object to any order.
5
MR. EVANS: Okay. Thank you, Your
6 Honor.
7
THE COURT: All right.
8
(Hearing adjourned.)
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County of SALT LAKE
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I. diLLiE w w ccr. do hereby certify that I

j 7 am a Certmed Court Transcnbcr in and for the State
j 8 of Utah:
i 9

That I reduced the proceedings aforesaid to

J 10 print from videotape to the best of my ability;
ill

I further certify that [ have no interest in

; 12 the event of this action.
! 13

WITNESS MY HAND this the 26th day of
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